McLoughlin v O'Brien [1983] 1 AC 410

Facts

• Psychiatric harm in law refers to a recognized mental disorder caused by another's actions or omissions, distinct from mere emotional distress or normal emotions.
• The claimant in McLoughlin v O’Brien sought damages for psychiatric harm suffered after learning about and witnessing the aftermath of a traumatic accident involving her family.
• Courts require claimants to demonstrate the presence of a medically recognized psychiatric illness, rather than transient emotional responses, to establish actionable harm.
• The law distinguishes between primary victims (directly involved in the incident or fearing for their own safety) and secondary victims (witnessing harm to others or its immediate aftermath).
• Case law, including McLoughlin v O’Brien, Page v Smith, and Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire Police, defines the boundaries and requirements for such claims.

Issues

1. Whether a claimant can recover for psychiatric harm arising from witnessing or learning about an accident involving close relatives.
2. What constitutes a sufficient medically recognized psychiatric condition for establishing a claim.
3. What legal thresholds distinguish actionable psychiatric injury from ordinary grief or distress.
4. Whether the claimant's proximity in time and space to the accident or its aftermath meets the legal requirement for secondary victims.
5. How foreseeability and closeness of relationship affect the existence of a duty of care for psychiatric harm.

Decision

• The court held that to recover for psychiatric harm, a claimant must have suffered a medically recognized psychiatric illness.
• For secondary victims, recovery required close ties of love and affection with the primary victim, and proximity to the event or its immediate aftermath.
• The harm experienced must result from a sudden and shocking event, rather than gradual exposure or news.
• Ordinary distress or grief, in the absence of clinical illness, was deemed insufficient for compensation.
• The requirements of foreseeability and proximity were applied stringently to restrict the class of claimants eligible for recovery.

Legal Principles

• Psychiatric harm must be clinically diagnosed as a recognized mental disorder to be actionable.
• The distinction between primary and secondary victims is fundamental; primary victims need only show foreseeability of personal injury, while secondary victims face stricter tests.
• Secondary victims must demonstrate a close relationship with the primary victim, direct perception of the event or its immediate aftermath, and the harm must be induced by a sudden shock.
• Foreseeability and proximity are essential for establishing duty of care, particularly for secondary victims.
• The "thin skull" rule applies: once some psychiatric injury is foreseeable, the defendant is liable for the full extent of the harm, even if exacerbated by pre-existing vulnerability.
• Policy concerns, such as the potential for excessive litigation and difficulties in medical verification, have led courts to impose stringent technical requirements for recovery.

Conclusion

McLoughlin v O’Brien confirmed that claims for psychiatric harm in English law demand both a medically recognized condition and strict adherence to criteria distinguishing primary and secondary victims, with emphasis on foreseeability, proximity, and policy limitations to define the scope of liability.