## Facts

- Donnie and June McManus bought a Fleetwood Class A motor home in Texas to tow a Jeep Cherokee.
- A “CARRYING CAPACITY” tag on the wardrobe door stated “GTW 3500 LBS” and defined GTW as the maximum permissible loaded weight the motor home was designed to tow; it also directed buyers to consult the owner’s manual for weighing and towing guidelines.
- A salesperson allegedly assured Mr. McManus the motor home could tow a Jeep Cherokee.
- Fleetwood had information from chassis manufacturers indicating that towing at higher weights required supplemental brakes (e.g., one manufacturer indicated supplemental brakes were needed above 1,500 pounds).
- An internal Fleetwood memorandum recommended listing two gross combination weights—one for towed loads without brakes and one with supplemental brakes—to assure safe operation.
- The McManuses alleged Fleetwood’s 3,500-pound towing representation implied safe braking at that weight and that Fleetwood failed to adequately disclose the need for supplemental brakes.
- Plaintiffs sought to represent a Texas-only subclass of purchasers of Fleetwood Class A motor homes (1994–1999), asserting fraud- and warranty-based theories under Texas law and seeking injunctive relief and damages.
- The district court certified a Rule 23(b)(2) class for injunctive relief and a Rule 23(b)(3) class for damages, and applied Texas substantive law.

## Issues

1. Whether Rule 23(b)(3) predominance was satisfied when several asserted causes of action required individualized proof of reliance (or reliance-like “basis of the bargain” proof), despite standardized tags and materials.
2. Whether certification under Rule 23(b)(2) was improper because the action primarily sought monetary damages and would bypass Rule 23(b)(3) notice and opt-out protections.

## Decision

- The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
- Rule 23(b)(3): Certification was reversed for fraudulent concealment, negligent misrepresentation, express warranty, and other reliance-dependent theories because individualized reliance questions predominated.
- Rule 23(b)(3): Certification was affirmed for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability because the central defect/fitness question was susceptible to common proof and did not depend on individual reliance.
- Rule 23(b)(2): Certification was reversed because the case primarily sought monetary relief; injunctive relief was secondary and (b)(2) treatment would improperly avoid (b)(3) procedural protections.

## Legal Principles

- Under Texas law, fraud-type and negligent misrepresentation claims generally require individualized proof of reliance; standardized written materials alone do not establish class-wide reliance for Rule 23(b)(3) predominance.
- For express warranty claims, whether a representation became part of the “basis of the bargain” may require individualized proof that can defeat predominance.
- Implied warranty of merchantability turns on an objective inquiry into product fitness at the time of sale; where alleged unfitness is common across units, common issues may predominate under Rule 23(b)(3).
- Rule 23(b)(2) is directed to cases seeking class-wide injunctive or declaratory relief; it is improper when monetary damages are the primary relief sought, particularly because (b)(2) lacks the notice and opt-out protections required for (b)(3) damages classes.

## Conclusion

The Fifth Circuit limited class treatment to a damages class on the implied warranty of merchantability claim, holding that reliance-driven theories could not satisfy Rule 23(b)(3) predominance and that Rule 23(b)(2) certification was improper where damages were the main objective.


McManus v. Fleetwood Enters., Inc., 320 F.3d 545 (5th Cir. 2003)