## Facts

- Parents divorced in Wyoming in 1981; mother received primary custody of their son, Emmett, with reasonable visitation for father.
- Father filed for partial custody in Pennsylvania in 1982; the court awarded mother general custody and structured visitation for father.
- Over several years, repeated modification petitions resulted in expanded visitation for father.
- By 1986, Emmett repeatedly stated he wanted to live with father; his relationship with mother and stepfather deteriorated, and he reported being harassed or frightened by the stepfather.
- Father had remarried; Emmett developed a close relationship with father and stepmother, who were found to take a more active role in his life.
- After a 1988 hearing, the trial court found both homes suitable and both parents equally acceptable custodians, and awarded general custody to father based largely on Emmett’s sustained preference.
- The Superior Court vacated the custody change and reinstated a prior order keeping primary custody with mother, reasoning there were no circumstances warranting a change and custody should not change merely because a child wishes it.

## Issues

1. Whether an appellate court exceeds its scope of review in a custody case by disregarding trial-court fact findings and credibility determinations and re-weighing the record.
2. Whether a trial court may give decisive weight to an 11-year-old child’s well-reasoned custodial preference when both parents’ homes are found equally suitable.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed the Superior Court and reinstated the trial court’s custody award to the father.
- The Court held the Superior Court improperly substituted its judgment for the trial court’s findings and credibility assessments, effectively re-trying the case on a cold record.
- The Court held that a mature child’s preference, when grounded in good reasons, is an important best-interests factor and may tip the balance when both homes are otherwise equally acceptable.

## Legal Principles

- The controlling standard in custody disputes is the child’s best interests, assessed by considering all factors affecting the child’s welfare.
- Custody determinations are not governed by sex-based presumptions; there is no maternal preference.
- Appellate review of custody orders is highly deferential: appellate courts may not re-weigh evidence or disturb the trial court’s conclusions absent an unreasonable abuse of discretion.
- A child’s stated preference is not controlling, but must be considered; it carries weight when the child is sufficiently mature and intelligent and the preference is supported by good reasons.
- Where both parental homes are equally acceptable, a mature, well-reasoned child preference may properly be decisive.

## Conclusion

The court reinstated the trial court’s custody award to the father, holding that appellate courts must defer to trial-court findings in custody matters and that a mature child’s reasoned preference may determine custody when both homes are otherwise equally suitable.


McMillen v. McMillen, 529 Pa. 198, 602 A.2d 845 (Pa. 1992)