McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (1991)

Facts

  • Paul McNeil was charged in Wisconsin state court with an armed robbery in West Allis, Wisconsin.
  • At a bail hearing on the robbery charge, McNeil was represented by a public defender.
  • While jailed on the robbery charge, police initiated questioning on three occasions about an unrelated murder and related offenses in Caledonia, Wisconsin.
  • Before each interrogation, police administered Miranda warnings; McNeil signed written waivers and made incriminating statements.
  • McNeil was later formally charged with the Caledonia offenses.
  • McNeil moved to suppress his statements, arguing that his right to counsel had been violated; the trial court denied the motion.
  • McNeil was convicted of the Caledonia offenses and sentenced to 60 years; the Wisconsin Supreme Court affirmed.

Issues

  1. Whether invocation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel at a judicial proceeding for a charged offense constitutes an invocation of the Fifth Amendment Miranda right to counsel that bars police-initiated custodial interrogation about unrelated, uncharged offenses.

Decision

  • The Supreme Court affirmed the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
  • Invocation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel for the West Allis robbery did not bar admission of statements about the uncharged Caledonia crimes.
  • McNeil’s statements about the Caledonia offenses were admissible because he received Miranda warnings and executed waivers, and he had not independently invoked the Miranda right to counsel.
  • The Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches only after initiation of adversary judicial proceedings and is offense-specific.
  • The Sixth Amendment’s offense-specific protection does not extend to questioning about crimes for which adversary proceedings have not begun.
  • The Miranda (Fifth Amendment) right to counsel arises from custodial interrogation and is not offense-specific once invoked.
  • Invocation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not, by itself, constitute invocation of the Miranda right to counsel; Miranda/Edwards protection requires an independent assertion of the suspect’s desire to deal with police only through counsel.
  • Police-initiated interrogation about uncharged offenses is permissible after a valid Miranda waiver, absent a separate Miranda-based request for counsel.

Conclusion

The Court held that requesting or receiving counsel for a charged offense under the Sixth Amendment does not automatically invoke the Miranda right to counsel for custodial interrogation about unrelated, uncharged offenses; where the suspect is properly warned and waives Miranda rights, statements on the uncharged offenses are admissible.