## Facts

- A new 2004 Mazda RX-8 was purchased for $30,854 and gifted to Courtney McNiff.
- The vehicle developed recurring mechanical problems; Mazda provided a replacement engine, but problems continued.
- McNiff sued Mazda and the selling dealer, alleging breach of written warranty and breach of implied warranty of merchantability under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.
- McNiff retained counsel under a contingency-fee agreement providing for a percentage of any recovery.
- The parties settled: Mazda agreed to repurchase the vehicle for $30,000; the settlement did not include attorney’s fees.
- McNiff petitioned for statutory attorney’s fees and costs under Magnuson-Moss, seeking fees based on hours worked and hourly rates; Mazda objected that the contingency agreement capped fees and that the hours/rates were unreasonable.
- The trial court awarded $26,015.50 in attorney’s fees and costs using an hourly approach with some rate reductions and denied both sides’ motions to reconsider; McNiff also was denied additional fees for responding to Mazda’s reconsideration motion.

## Issues

1. Whether a contingency-fee agreement limits or caps a statutory attorney’s fee award under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in determining reasonable hours and hourly rates for the fee award.
3. Whether the consumer may recover statutory fees for time spent responding to a post-judgment motion challenging the fee award.
4. Whether the consumer may seek attorney’s fees and costs incurred on appeal under Magnuson-Moss.

## Decision

- Affirmed the trial court’s use of an hourly, time-expended method for Magnuson-Moss fees; the contingency-fee agreement did not cap the statutory award.
- Affirmed the trial court’s overall reasonableness determinations on hours and rates for the fee award entered after settlement.
- Reversed the denial of fees for time spent responding to Mazda’s motion to reconsider and remanded to determine and award a reasonable amount for that work.
- Remanded to permit McNiff to seek reasonable attorney’s fees and costs incurred on appeal under the statute.

## Legal Principles

- Under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, a prevailing consumer may recover reasonable attorney’s fees and expenses, and a court may base the award on actual time expended.
- A private contingency-fee agreement may be considered in assessing reasonableness but does not impose a hard cap on a statutory fee award.
- Reasonable-fee determinations commonly use a lodestar-type approach (reasonable hours multiplied by a reasonable rate), subject to the trial court’s discretion.
- Compensable work under fee-shifting statutes can include reasonable post-judgment efforts necessary to defend or secure the fee award and reasonable fees incurred on appeal when authorized by the statute.

## Conclusion

The appellate court held that Magnuson-Moss permits reasonable attorney’s fees based on time expended even when the client signed a contingency-fee agreement, and it required an additional award for reasonable work opposing a reconsideration motion while allowing the consumer to petition for appellate fees on remand.


McNiff v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 384 Ill. App. 3d 401, 892 N.E.2d 598 (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. 2008)