## Facts

- Martin Mead, Jr. worked for Western Slate, Inc. in its slate quarry and had experience as a mechanic, sawyer, and driller.
- Jeffrey N. Harrison, a co-owner of Western Slate, generally oversaw quarry operations.
- Harrison assigned Mead to work beneath a quarry high wall while Mead prepared stone for excavation by drilling holes.
- Mead observed signs that a rock fall had recently occurred near where he was working.
- Mead notified Harrison about the apparent rock fall and the conditions near the high wall.
- Harrison did not direct Mead to stop work or leave the area.
- Mead continued working beneath the high wall.
- A second rock fall occurred and injured Mead.
- Mead received workers’ compensation benefits.
- Mead (and his spouse) sued Western Slate and Harrison in tort, claiming the case fit Vermont’s intentional-injury exception to workers’ compensation exclusivity.
- At trial, the jury was instructed that Mead could prove “specific intent” either by showing (1) a purpose or desire to injure, or (2) knowledge to a “substantial certainty” that injury would result.
- The jury found defendants knew to a substantial certainty Mead would be injured if he continued to work and awarded damages.
- The trial court denied defendants’ post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law (or, alternatively, a new trial), and defendants appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether Vermont’s intentional-injury exception to workers’ compensation exclusivity can be satisfied by proof that the employer knew to a “substantial certainty” that its conduct would injure the employee, rather than proof of a purpose or desire to injure.
2. Whether the evidence was sufficient as a matter of law to show that Western Slate or Harrison either intended to injure Mead or knew Mead’s injury was virtually certain to occur.

## Decision

- The Vermont Supreme Court reversed the judgment for Mead.
- The Court directed entry of judgment in favor of Western Slate and Harrison.
- The Court held the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to establish that defendants acted with the specific intent required to escape workers’ compensation exclusivity, and it declined to extend the exception into a broad “substantial certainty” rule that would treat aggravated negligence as intentional injury.

## Legal Principles

- Vermont’s Workers’ Compensation Act generally makes workers’ compensation the exclusive remedy for workplace injuries. 21 V.S.A. § 622.
- Vermont recognizes a narrow exception for intentional injury by the employer, rooted in the requirement of a “specific intent to injure” (as stated in prior Vermont precedent).
- The intentional-injury exception is not met by proof that an employer knew of a dangerous condition, tolerated unsafe practices, or exposed an employee to a high risk of harm; even willful, wanton, or reckless conduct is not enough without the intent required for intentional tort liability.
- A broad “substantial certainty” instruction risks converting serious negligence into intentional injury and would erode the exclusivity bargain of workers’ compensation; Vermont declined to expand the exception on that basis.
- Even assuming some “substantial certainty” concept could apply, it must operate as the functional equivalent of specific intent—requiring proof that the employer subjectively knew injury to this employee was essentially inevitable from the conduct at issue.
- When reviewing denial of judgment as a matter of law, the appellate court asks whether the evidence, viewed in the nonmovant’s favor, could support a verdict under the governing legal standard; where it cannot, judgment must be entered for the movant.

## Conclusion

The Vermont Supreme Court held that Mead’s injuries arose in the course of employment and were covered by workers’ compensation, and that the record—though it could support findings of serious fault in allowing work to continue under a hazardous high wall—did not permit a reasonable jury to find that Western Slate or Harrison specifically intended to injure Mead or knew injury was virtually certain; accordingly, workers’ compensation exclusivity barred the tort suit and judgment was ordered for defendants.


Mead v. Western Slate, Inc., 848 A.2d 257 (2004)