## Facts

- Abbott sold Norvir (ritonavir), initially marketed as a stand-alone HIV protease inhibitor, but later widely used in low doses to “boost” competing protease inhibitors.
- Abbott also sold Kaletra, a combination product containing lopinavir plus ritonavir, used as a boosted protease inhibitor regimen.
- By 2003, competing protease inhibitors (including products associated with GlaxoSmithKline) were entering or nearing entry into the market and could compete with Kaletra when boosted with Norvir.
- GlaxoSmithKline held a license agreement permitting use and marketing of Norvir as a booster with its protease inhibitor in exchange for royalties.
- Plaintiffs alleged Abbott raised the wholesale price of Norvir by roughly 400% while keeping Kaletra’s price unchanged, increasing rivals’ costs for boosted regimens that depended on Norvir.
- Direct-purchaser plaintiffs alleged Abbott’s conduct helped maintain or obtain monopoly power in a market defined as “boosted protease inhibitors.”
- GlaxoSmithKline alleged Abbott’s conduct frustrated the purpose of the license arrangement and violated North Carolina common-law and statutory duties.
- Abbott moved to dismiss the federal antitrust claims, moved to dismiss GlaxoSmithKline’s state-law claims, and sought transfer of GlaxoSmithKline’s case to Illinois.

## Issues

1. Whether the complaints plausibly stated monopolization and attempted monopolization claims based on Norvir pricing and related conduct in the alleged “boosted protease inhibitor” market, or whether they were foreclosed at the pleading stage by Ninth Circuit bundled-pricing doctrine.
2. Whether a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim under North Carolina law can proceed where the plaintiff alleges bad-faith performance frustrating the contract’s benefits without pleading an independent breach of an express contract term, and whether related North Carolina statutory claims were adequately pleaded.
3. Whether the GlaxoSmithKline action should be transferred to Illinois under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).

## Decision

- The court denied Abbott’s motion to dismiss the direct purchasers’ federal antitrust claims.
- The court denied Abbott’s motion to dismiss GlaxoSmithKline’s implied-covenant and related North Carolina statutory claims.
- The court denied Abbott’s motion to transfer the GlaxoSmithKline action to Illinois.

## Legal Principles

- Under Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 8, antitrust plaintiffs must plead facts that plausibly support a relevant market, market power (or dangerous probability of achieving it), exclusionary conduct, and anticompetitive effects; detailed economic proof is not required at the pleading stage.
- Bundled-pricing precedent does not automatically bar claims when the alleged theory is broader exclusionary conduct leveraging a product’s unique role to disadvantage rivals; whether a specific pricing test applies may require factual development.
- Under North Carolina law, an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing claim may be stated where a party plausibly alleges bad-faith performance or use of contractual discretion that deprives the counterparty of the contract’s benefits, even absent a separately pleaded breach of an express term.
- Transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) requires a strong showing that the transferee forum is clearly more convenient and that the interests of justice favor transfer; related-case efficiencies and judicial economy may weigh against transfer.

## Conclusion

The court held that the pleadings plausibly alleged exclusionary conduct tied to Norvir’s booster role and a targeted price increase sufficient to proceed on federal monopolization theories, that GlaxoSmithKline adequately alleged bad-faith performance supporting an implied-covenant claim and related North Carolina statutory claims, and that Abbott did not justify transfer given consolidated proceedings and § 1404(a) considerations.


Meijer, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 544 F. Supp. 2d 995 (N.D. Cal. 2008)