## Facts

- Sharon Mello, an employee of Big Y Foods, Inc., suffered a burn to her right foot and ankle in the course of her employment on July 3, 1998.
- The burn later resulted in permanent and significant scarring to her foot and ankle.
- Big Y accepted the injury as compensable and paid medical care, wage-replacement benefits, and compensation for a 3% permanent disability to the right foot.
- Mello sought additional workers’ compensation benefits for scarring under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-308(c).
- The workers’ compensation commissioner found no scarring to Mello’s face, head, or neck and found the foot/ankle scarring did not affect her ability to obtain or keep work; the commissioner therefore denied scarring benefits.
- Mello then filed a negligence action in Superior Court against Big Y seeking damages for the same scarring.
- The trial court reserved two questions to the Connecticut Supreme Court concerning workers’ compensation exclusivity and an “open courts” challenge under article first, § 10 of the Connecticut Constitution.

## Issues

1. Whether Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-284(a) bars an employee’s negligence action against the employer for permanent scarring arising from a compensable work injury when the scarring is not compensable under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-308(c).
2. If the action is barred, whether applying the exclusivity provision violates article first, § 10 of the Connecticut Constitution as applied to these facts.

## Decision

- The court answered the first reserved question yes: the negligence action was barred by the Workers’ Compensation Act’s exclusive-remedy provision, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-284(a).
- The court answered the second reserved question no: barring the action did not violate article first, § 10 of the Connecticut Constitution.
- The effect of the decision was to preclude Mello’s tort claim against her employer for the scarring.

## Legal Principles

- Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-284(a) abolishes all common-law rights and claims between employer and employee “on account of” personal injury arising out of and in the course of employment, except the rights and claims provided by the Workers’ Compensation Act.
- Exclusivity turns on whether the injury arises out of and in the course of employment; it does not depend on whether every consequence of that injury is compensable under each specific benefit provision.
- A denial of a particular category of workers’ compensation benefits (here, scarring benefits under § 31-308(c)) does not create an exception permitting a civil damages action against the employer for the same work-related injury consequences.
- Under article first, § 10, the legislature may limit or abolish common-law remedies when it provides a reasonably adequate statutory substitute; workers’ compensation is a constitutionally permissible substitute even if benefits are limited.
- An employee is not “without a remedy” for article first, § 10 purposes where the underlying work injury is compensable and compensated under the Act, notwithstanding the unavailability of additional compensation for a particular element of harm.

## Conclusion

Connecticut’s Workers’ Compensation Act provided the exclusive remedy for Mello’s work-related burn injury and its scarring consequences, so her negligence action against her employer was barred even though the scarring was not compensable under the Act’s scarring provision; this application of exclusivity did not violate the state constitution’s open-courts/remedy clause.


Mello v. Big Y Foods, Inc., 826 A.2d 1117 (Conn. 2003)