## Facts

- Guadalupe Mendez, William Robinson, and Alfred Fuschak were drinking when Robinson proposed shooting Ray Richmond because Richmond had dated Robinson’s girlfriend.
- Mendez obtained a shotgun; Robinson and Fuschak obtained rifles.
- The three drove to Richmond’s parents’ home (where Richmond was not present), shot up a car outside, and fired at least eight shots at the house.
- They then went to Tommy DeArman’s house and shot up DeArman’s car.
- As they left DeArman’s house, Robinson fired randomly at several houses; one shot entered a home and struck Rafael Martinez while he slept, killing him shortly thereafter.
- Mendez’s confession was admitted at trial.
- Mendez and Fuschak testified they tried to dissuade Robinson and that Mendez did not shoot at the houses, but they continued with Robinson during the spree after those efforts.

## Issues

1. Whether Texas’s law of parties permits conviction as a party to involuntary manslaughter, an offense lacking a specific intent to kill.
2. Whether the jury charge submitting party liability for involuntary manslaughter was improper as a matter of law.
3. Whether the evidence was sufficient to support Mendez’s conviction for involuntary manslaughter under a party-liability theory.

## Decision

- The court affirmed the conviction for involuntary manslaughter and the five-year sentence.
- The law of parties was held applicable to involuntary manslaughter.
- The trial court did not err by instructing the jury on party liability.
- The evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to find Mendez criminally responsible as a party.

## Legal Principles

- Party liability may apply to crimes defined by reckless conduct and unintended results (including involuntary manslaughter) when the defendant, with intent to promote or assist, solicits, encourages, directs, aids, or attempts to aid the principal’s commission of the offense.
- The specific-intent requirement for criminal attempt does not limit party liability; attempt requires intent to commit a particular offense, while party liability turns on intentional assistance or encouragement of the conduct that constitutes the offense.
- A defendant’s continued participation in a joint, dangerous undertaking may support a finding that the defendant intended to promote or assist the reckless conduct leading to death, even if the defendant claims to have urged the principal to stop.

## Conclusion

The court upheld Mendez’s involuntary manslaughter conviction, ruling that accomplice liability extends to reckless-result offenses when the defendant intentionally assists or encourages the underlying dangerous conduct that culminates in death.


Mendez v. State, 575 S.W.2d 36 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979)