## Facts

- Nicholas Meriwether, a philosophy professor at a public university, addressed students in class using honorifics such as “Mr.” or “Ms.” with last names.
- The university informed faculty that its nondiscrimination policy required use of pronouns consistent with a student’s asserted gender identity.
- A transgender student asked Meriwether to use female titles and pronouns; he refused, stating religious and philosophical objections.
- Meriwether proposed addressing the student by last name only while continuing his honorific practice for other students.
- The student complained that the last-name-only approach singled her out and treated her differently from other female students.
- After a Title IX process, the university concluded Meriwether’s refusal created a hostile environment and constituted disparate treatment, and issued a written warning directing compliance to avoid further corrective action.
- Meriwether pursued a union grievance and then sued, alleging violations of free speech, free exercise, due process, and equal protection.
- The district court dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), treating the classroom speech as unprotected employee speech and rejecting the other constitutional claims.

## Issues

1. Whether a public university professor’s in-class speech related to teaching is categorically unprotected under the public-employee rule of *Garcetti*.
2. Whether disciplining a professor for declining to use requested pronouns plausibly states a First Amendment free speech claim, including compelled-speech and viewpoint-discrimination theories.
3. Whether the complaint plausibly alleges a Free Exercise Clause violation based on nonneutral or nongenerally applicable enforcement of the university policy.
4. Whether the complaint plausibly states due process or equal protection violations based on the asserted interests and alleged differential treatment.

## Decision

- The Sixth Circuit reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.
- The court held Meriwether plausibly alleged First Amendment free speech violations; *Garcetti* did not categorically remove protection for in-class teaching and scholarship-related speech.
- The court held Meriwether plausibly alleged a Free Exercise Clause violation because the pleaded facts supported an inference the policy was not enforced in a neutral and generally applicable manner.
- The court affirmed dismissal of certain due process and equal protection claims for failure to plead a protected interest or otherwise state a claim.
- Because the case was at the pleading stage, the court accepted Meriwether’s allegations as true and drew reasonable inferences in his favor.

## Legal Principles

- Public university instructors retain First Amendment protection when engaged in core academic functions such as teaching and scholarship; *Garcetti* does not automatically govern that category of speech.
- Classroom speech addressing contested questions of sex and gender identity may involve matters of public concern and can receive constitutional protection.
- The First Amendment limits governmental compelled speech, including compelled use of language that conveys an ideological message contrary to the speaker’s beliefs.
- Governmental discipline targeting a speaker’s viewpoint on a controversial topic may constitute viewpoint discrimination, the most disfavored form of content-based regulation.
- When a government policy is plausibly alleged to be nonneutral or not generally applicable—such as through discretionary exceptions or differential enforcement—Free Exercise claims may proceed and can trigger strict scrutiny.
- At the motion-to-dismiss stage, courts evaluate plausibility on the pleadings and do not resolve factual disputes about disruption, discrimination, or institutional justification.

## Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit allowed a public university professor to proceed on claims that discipline for refusing requested pronouns in class plausibly violated the First Amendment and the Free Exercise Clause, while leaving certain due process and equal protection theories dismissed and remanding for further proceedings.


Meriwether v. Hartop, 992 F.3d 492 (6th Cir. 2021)