Facts
- Congress enacted the Metropolitan Washington Airports Act of 1986, transferring operational control of Washington National and Dulles airports from the federal government to the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority (MWAA), an interstate entity formed by Virginia and the District of Columbia.
- National Airport’s high traffic and flight paths over densely populated areas produced resident concerns about safety, noise, and pollution.
- To prevent local control from shifting traffic away from National contrary to federal policy, the Act required MWAA to establish a Board of Review.
- The Board of Review consisted of nine sitting Members of Congress drawn from aviation-related committees, described as acting “in their individual capacities.”
- The Board of Review had continuing authority to veto decisions made by MWAA’s Board of Directors.
- MWAA adopted bylaws implementing the Board of Review, and MWAA’s directors appointed the Board of Review members from lists submitted by Congress.
- MWAA adopted a Master Plan for expanded facilities at National; the Board of Review did not disapprove it.
- A residents’ group and affected individuals sued, alleging that assigning veto authority to a Member-of-Congress Board violated separation of powers.
Issues
- Whether Congress may create a board composed of sitting Members of Congress and give it veto power over decisions of an entity implementing federal law, consistent with separation of powers.
- Whether such a veto mechanism circumvents constitutional requirements for lawmaking (bicameralism and presentment) by allowing congressional control outside Article I procedures.
- Whether granting binding, significant executive authority to a body not appointed under Article II violates structural limits, including the Appointments Clause.
- If the veto mechanism is unconstitutional, whether the remainder of the transfer scheme may remain in effect.
Decision
- The Supreme Court affirmed the D.C. Circuit and held the Board of Review’s veto power unconstitutional.
- The Court concluded the Board of Review exercised executive power because its veto authority was direct, continuing, and substantial in controlling MWAA’s implementation choices.
- Congress may not retain ongoing control over execution of the laws by placing that control in agents tied to Congress.
- The “individual capacities” label did not cure the constitutional defect because the Board’s composition, selection, and function were linked to Congress and derived from federal law.
- The invalid veto mechanism was severable; the transfer scheme could operate without the Board of Review’s control.
Legal Principles
- Congress may not vest executive power in agents subject to congressional control; after enacting a statute, Congress must act through constitutionally prescribed mechanisms to change or direct execution.
- Binding control over execution that bypasses bicameralism and presentment is inconsistent with Article I’s lawmaking procedures.
- Officials exercising significant executive authority must be selected in conformity with Article II appointment requirements; Congress cannot maintain day-to-day executive control through a body of its own Members.
- Constitutional analysis turns on functional reality and legal effect, not on formal labels describing officeholders as acting in “individual capacities.”
- When an unconstitutional control device is embedded in a broader statutory arrangement, courts may invalidate the device while leaving the remainder in place if the statutory scheme can function as intended without it.
Conclusion
The Court held that Congress violated separation of powers by giving a board composed of sitting Members of Congress ongoing veto authority over MWAA’s operational decisions, because it allowed congressional control over execution of federal law outside Article I procedures and inconsistent with Article II structural limits; the veto mechanism was invalidated while the transfer framework remained effective.