Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981)

Facts

  • San Diego adopted an ordinance broadly prohibiting “outdoor advertising display signs” permanently affixed to land or structures, justified by traffic safety and aesthetics.
  • The ordinance generally banned off-site billboard advertising but allowed on-site commercial signs identifying the premises or advertising goods or services provided there.
  • The ordinance also exempted specified categories of signs, including government signs, bus stop signs, historical plaques, religious symbols, vehicle signs, and temporary political campaign signs.
  • Outdoor advertising companies that owned and operated hundreds of billboards within the city challenged the ordinance, alleging it exceeded municipal authority and violated the First Amendment.
  • A state trial court held the ordinance unconstitutional; the intermediate appellate court affirmed on municipal-power grounds.
  • The California Supreme Court reversed, upholding the ordinance as a valid land-use measure and rejecting a facial First Amendment challenge.
  • The U.S. Supreme Court reviewed the ordinance; no single opinion commanded a majority, but a majority of Justices agreed the ordinance’s treatment of noncommercial speech was unconstitutional.

Issues

  1. Whether a city may broadly prohibit off-site outdoor advertising signs to advance traffic safety and aesthetics consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
  2. Whether allowing on-site commercial signs while generally prohibiting noncommercial messages on comparable permanent signs unlawfully discriminates against noncommercial speech.
  3. Whether content-based exemptions for selected topics or speakers render a sign ordinance facially unconstitutional.

Decision

  • The Court reversed the judgment upholding the ordinance.
  • A majority concluded the ordinance was invalid because it discriminated against noncommercial speech by permitting on-site commercial advertising while broadly barring noncommercial messages on permanent signs.
  • The plurality reasoned that, as applied to commercial speech alone, the ordinance largely satisfied the commercial-speech framework, but the overall scheme failed due to its restrictions on noncommercial expression.
  • The Court treated traffic safety and aesthetics as substantial governmental interests that can justify regulation of the physical and locational aspects of signs.
  • Government may regulate the noncommunicative aspects of billboards (location, size, and related land-use impacts) to further traffic safety and aesthetics, but it may not control communicative content through discriminatory rules.
  • A regulatory scheme may not give commercial speech more favorable treatment than noncommercial speech; noncommercial expression cannot be subordinated to on-site commercial advertising.
  • Content-based exemptions that select favored noncommercial topics or speakers, while excluding other noncommercial messages, create unconstitutional discrimination among protected speech.
  • Under commercial-speech doctrine, restrictions on commercial advertising must directly advance substantial interests and be no more extensive than necessary; satisfaction of that standard does not cure a scheme that impermissibly burdens noncommercial speech.

Conclusion

San Diego could pursue traffic safety and aesthetics through sign regulation, but its ordinance was unconstitutional because it allowed on-site commercial signs and selected exempt categories while broadly suppressing noncommercial messages on permanent outdoor signs, resulting in impermissible content-based discrimination under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.