## Facts

- John and Cynthia Holley, an interracial couple, attempted to buy a house listed through Triad, Inc., a residential real estate corporation.
- A Triad salesman allegedly interfered with the purchase for racially discriminatory reasons.
- The Holleys sued the salesman and Triad under the Fair Housing Act (FHA) for housing discrimination.
- The Holleys also sued David Meyer personally, alleging he was vicariously liable because he was Triad’s president, sole shareholder, and the corporation’s licensed “officer/broker.”
- The federal district court dismissed the claims against Meyer, concluding the FHA did not impose personal vicarious liability on a corporate officer or designated broker based solely on corporate status.
- The Ninth Circuit reversed, reasoning that Meyer’s right to control the employee supported liability beyond ordinary principal-agent limits.
- The Supreme Court granted review.

## Issues

1. Whether the FHA imposes personal, faultless (strict) vicarious liability on a corporate officer/owner for a corporation’s employee’s discriminatory housing practices.
2. Whether statutory silence in the FHA permits expanding vicarious liability beyond traditional agency principles to reach corporate owners/officers based only on a right of control.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Ninth Circuit.
- The Court held that the FHA incorporates traditional agency principles for vicarious liability.
- Under those principles, vicarious liability ordinarily falls on the employing entity (the corporation), not automatically on its officers or owners.
- Meyer could not be held vicariously liable solely because of his corporate roles or his right to control the salesman.
- The Court reinstated dismissal of the claims against Meyer.

## Legal Principles

- When Congress creates a statutory cause of action sounding in tort, courts generally presume it incorporates ordinary tort-related vicarious liability rules unless Congress clearly indicates otherwise.
- The FHA supports vicarious liability consistent with traditional agency law, even though the statute does not expressly discuss vicarious liability.
- Traditional vicarious liability makes principals/employers liable for acts of agents/employees within the scope of authority or employment.
- Absent special circumstances, the corporation—not its owners or officers—is the principal/employer for purposes of vicarious liability for employees’ discriminatory acts.
- Statutory silence and general policy goals against discrimination do not justify imposing an unusual, expanded regime of personal, non-delegable duty or strict liability on corporate officers/owners without clear congressional direction.

## Conclusion

The Court held that the FHA’s vicarious liability regime tracks traditional agency principles, which ordinarily place liability on the corporate employer rather than automatically on corporate officers or owners; personal liability requires more than corporate status or a generalized right to control employees.


Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280 (2003)