## Facts

- Thomas W. Tucker was arrested for rape and subjected to custodial interrogation at a police station before *Miranda* was decided.
- Police advised Tucker of his right to remain silent, his right to counsel, and that his statements could be used against him, but did not advise that counsel would be appointed if he was indigent.
- Tucker gave an alibi and identified a friend, Henderson, as being with him at the time of the crime.
- Police located and interviewed Henderson, whose statements tended to incriminate Tucker.
- Before trial, Tucker moved to exclude both his statements and Henderson’s testimony as products of a custodial interrogation lacking the full *Miranda* warnings.
- The trial court suppressed Tucker’s statements but admitted Henderson’s testimony; Tucker was convicted.
- Michigan appellate courts affirmed, but federal habeas relief was granted and affirmed on appeal on the ground that Henderson’s testimony was inadmissible derivative evidence.
- The Supreme Court granted review.

## Issues

1. Whether the omission of the appointed-counsel warning in a pre-*Miranda* custodial interrogation rendered Tucker’s statements involuntary in violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.
2. Whether a witness’s testimony discovered through such statements must be excluded as derivative evidence under the Fifth, Sixth, or Fourteenth Amendments.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Constitution did not require exclusion of Henderson’s testimony.
- The Court concluded the record showed Tucker’s statements were not involuntary and not the product of compulsion.
- Because the interrogation predated *Miranda*, the incomplete warning was treated as a failure to provide prophylactic safeguards rather than as a constitutional violation requiring suppression of derivative evidence.
- The Court held that admitting Henderson’s testimony did not violate the Fifth, Sixth, or Fourteenth Amendments.

## Legal Principles

- *Miranda* warnings function as prophylactic safeguards; a failure to administer a complete warning does not automatically establish compelled self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment.
- Derivative-evidence exclusion in this setting is assessed in light of the purposes of the exclusionary rule, including deterrence, and the presence or absence of police bad faith.
- Where a pre-*Miranda* interrogation is noncoercive and officers act consistent with then-existing law, excluding an independently testable witness’s testimony is generally not constitutionally required.
- The reliability concerns that support excluding compelled statements are reduced when the challenged evidence is a live witness subject to cross-examination at trial.

## Conclusion

The Court held that, because Tucker’s pre-*Miranda* statements were not compelled and the officers’ incomplete warning did not reflect bad faith, the Constitution did not require suppression of testimony from a witness identified through those statements.


Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974)