## Facts

- Thomas Joe Miller-El was tried for capital murder in Dallas County, Texas, and sentenced to death.
- During jury selection, prosecutors used peremptory challenges to strike 10 of 11 qualified Black venire members.
- Miller-El objected that the strikes were racially motivated and pointed to the district attorney’s office history and practices regarding exclusion of Black jurors; the trial court denied relief.
- After *Batson v. Kentucky* was decided, the state trial court on remand accepted the prosecution’s race-neutral explanations, and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed.
- In federal habeas proceedings, the district court denied relief; the court of appeals initially denied a certificate of appealability (COA).
- The Supreme Court required a COA in an earlier decision, and on remand the court of appeals rejected the Batson claim on the merits under AEDPA deference.
- The Supreme Court granted review to determine whether the state courts’ acceptance of the prosecution’s explanations could stand given the full jury-selection record.

## Issues

1. Whether the record established purposeful racial discrimination in the State’s peremptory strikes in violation of the Equal Protection Clause under *Batson*.
2. Whether the state courts’ acceptance of the State’s asserted race-neutral reasons was an unreasonable determination of the facts under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), permitting federal habeas relief.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed, 6–3, and held Miller-El was entitled to prevail on his Batson claim and receive habeas relief.
- The Court found the jury-selection record showed prosecutors selected and rejected potential jurors because of race.
- The Court relied on multiple forms of proof: the striking rate of Black venire members, side-by-side comparisons between struck Black jurors and seated white jurors, disparate questioning, use of the “jury shuffle” that disadvantaged Black venire members, and historical evidence of discriminatory practices in the district attorney’s office.
- The Court concluded that, in light of the whole record, the state courts’ contrary finding was not merely wrong but objectively unreasonable under AEDPA.
- Justice Breyer concurred separately.
- Justice Thomas dissented, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia, emphasizing deference to state factfinding and crediting the State’s explanations.

## Legal Principles

- The Equal Protection Clause forbids purposeful racial discrimination in jury selection, including discriminatory use of peremptory challenges.
- *Batson* requires consideration of “all relevant circumstances,” and proof may include statistical disparities, comparative juror analysis, disparate questioning, and other jury-selection practices bearing on intent.
- Comparative juror analysis can show pretext when a proffered reason for striking a Black venire member applies similarly to a non-Black juror who was allowed to serve.
- On federal habeas review, relief may be granted when the state court’s factual determination is unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).
- AEDPA deference does not require federal courts to accept state findings that are undermined by the record as a whole.

## Conclusion

The Court held that the prosecution’s peremptory strikes reflected purposeful racial discrimination under *Batson* and that the state courts’ acceptance of race-neutral explanations was an unreasonable determination of the facts under AEDPA, requiring federal habeas relief.


Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231 (2005)