## Facts

- Lula B. Miller, a Black woman with prior nursing-related experience in Charlotte, worked at another hospital as a nurse’s aide, later performed functions associated with an LPN role pending licensure, and repeatedly failed the LPN licensing exam.
- After resigning from her prior job in July 1973, Miller sought employment at Mercy Hospital and was not hired.
- On August 14, 1974, Miller applied in response to ads seeking applications for LPNs and nurse’s aides and was interviewed as part of Mercy’s routine applicant-screening process.
- Mercy used a standard written application that did not require an applicant to state race, and Miller’s completed form did not indicate her race by any entry or other obvious marking.
- On the application, Miller wrote “LPN” as her “Type of Work Preferred,” despite lacking LPN licensure.
- Miller was not hired and sued under Title VII, alleging Mercy’s failure to hire her as a nurse’s aide was racially discriminatory.
- After a bench trial, the district court found Mercy intentionally discriminated and awarded monetary relief, costs, and attorney’s fees; Mercy appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether the district court clearly erred in finding that Mercy intentionally discriminated on the basis of race in failing to hire Miller for a nurse’s aide position in violation of Title VII.

## Decision

- The Fourth Circuit reversed the judgment for Miller.
- The court held the district court’s ultimate finding of intentional discrimination was clearly erroneous on the whole record.
- The reversal eliminated the basis for the monetary award and associated relief entered for Miller.

## Legal Principles

- In a Title VII disparate-treatment case, the ultimate finding of discriminatory intent is a factual determination reviewed on appeal for clear error.
- A finding of intentional discrimination is undermined where the record does not support that the relevant decisionmakers knew the applicant’s race at the time of the hiring decision.
- An employer’s facially legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for a nonselection—such as lack of required licensure for the position the applicant indicated she sought—may defeat an inference of intentional discrimination absent persuasive proof of pretext.
- Appellate courts may reverse a trial court’s discrimination finding when, considering the complete evidentiary record, the inference of racial motive is not supportable.

## Conclusion

The Fourth Circuit concluded that, given the application’s lack of racial identifiers, uncertainty that Mercy knew Miller’s race when deciding, and legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons tied to her indicated preference for an unlicensed LPN role, the district court’s finding of intentional racial discrimination in Mercy’s failure to hire Miller could not stand and was reversed.


Miller v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 720 F.2d 356 (4th Cir. 1983)