## Facts

- In August 1990, James D. Miller applied for Social Security child’s insurance benefits based on disability (adult “child’s” benefits) under 42 U.S.C. § 402(d), alleging he became disabled while he was a dependent child of an insured wage earner.
- Miller was 34 years old when he filed the child’s disability application.
- In 1990, an administrative-law judge (ALJ) awarded Miller Social Security disability benefits on his own earnings record, finding Miller had a severe developmental disorder with borderline intellectual functioning.
- In that disability case, the ALJ concluded Miller’s impairments prevented him from performing even unskilled entry-level work and set the disability onset date at March 18, 1988.
- Miller relied on the same developmental disorder to support his separate claim for child’s disability benefits on a parent’s earnings record.
- Before his last job at a Ponderosa Steakhouse—where he worked as a dishwasher, breakfast cook, and janitor—Miller held multiple janitorial and food-service jobs and earned more than $300 per month for several years.
- The Secretary of Health and Human Services, Donna Shalala, denied Miller’s application for child’s disability benefits after finding Miller was not continuously disabled from before his twenty-second birthday through the time of his application.
- Miller sought judicial review in federal district court under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and moved for summary judgment, arguing (1) the Secretary wrongly required “continuous disability,” and (2) even under that test, the denial lacked substantial evidence because his work was not truly competitive and gainful.
- The Secretary filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.

## Issues

1. Whether entitlement to child’s disability benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 402(d) requires a claimant to prove disability began before age 22 and continued without interruption through the time of application/entitlement.
2. If a continuous-disability requirement applies, whether substantial evidence supported the Secretary’s finding that Miller was not continuously disabled because his post‑22 employment constituted substantial gainful activity (SGA).

## Decision

- The court granted summary judgment to the Secretary and denied Miller’s motion.
- The court upheld the Secretary’s interpretation of § 402(d) as requiring disability before age 22 and continuous disability thereafter through the time of entitlement.
- The court held substantial evidence supported the finding that Miller’s work history and earnings after age 22 showed SGA for significant periods, breaking any required continuity of disability.
- The court affirmed the agency’s denial of child’s disability benefits.

## Legal Principles

- For adult child’s disability benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 402(d), the Secretary may require proof that the claimant’s disability began before age 22 and continued without interruption to the time of entitlement.
- A claimant’s performance of SGA after age 22 is evidence of non-disability during that period and can defeat an adult child’s benefits claim by interrupting the required continuity.
- Earnings above regulatory SGA levels may support a finding that the claimant engaged in SGA, even where the claimant argues the work was not fully competitive.
- Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the district court’s role is limited to determining whether the Secretary applied the correct legal standards and whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence.

## Conclusion

The district court upheld the denial of Miller’s application for child’s disability benefits because the Secretary reasonably required him to show disability beginning before age 22 and continuing without interruption, and substantial evidence—especially Miller’s sustained post‑22 employment with earnings consistent with SGA—supported the finding that he was not continuously disabled.


Miller v. Shalala, 859 F. Supp. 297 (1994)