## Facts

- Richard C. Miller was convicted in a Texas trial court of aggravated robbery.
- His punishment was enhanced by two prior convictions and assessed at life imprisonment.
- On appeal, the conviction was affirmed; discretionary review was granted on a single issue concerning the jury charge on alibi.
- At trial, Miller relied on an alibi defense.
- The jury was instructed that if the evidence raised a reasonable doubt about Miller’s presence at the crime scene at the relevant time, the jury must acquit.
- Miller argued the alibi instruction misallocated the burden of proof and denied due process.

## Issues

1. Whether the trial court’s alibi instruction improperly shifted or misstated the burden of proof in a manner that violated due process.

## Decision

- The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the intermediate appellate court’s judgment and left the conviction and sentence intact.
- The court held the alibi instruction was proper because it tied alibi evidence to the reasonable-doubt standard.
- The court rejected treating alibi as an affirmative defense requiring proof by a preponderance of the evidence.
- The court noted Miller’s trial objection did not clearly track the burden-allocation theory advanced on discretionary review.

## Legal Principles

- Alibi is not a statutory affirmative defense under Texas law.
- Because alibi is not an affirmative defense, the State retains the burden to prove the defendant’s presence/identity beyond a reasonable doubt.
- Alibi evidence functions as defensive evidence that may raise a reasonable doubt; it does not impose a separate burden on the defendant to prove the alibi.
- A jury charge directing acquittal if alibi evidence raises a reasonable doubt about the defendant’s presence is a correct statement of law.

## Conclusion

The court upheld an alibi instruction that required acquittal if the evidence created a reasonable doubt about the defendant’s presence, reaffirming that alibi does not shift the burden of proof from the State and is not subject to the preponderance standard applicable to affirmative defenses.


Miller v. State, 660 S.W.2d 95 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983)