## Facts

- Daniel Mills provided board, nursing, lodging, and related expenses to Levi Wyman in Hartford, Connecticut from February 5 to February 20, 1821.
- Levi Wyman was about 25 years old, had long ceased being a member of his father’s household, became suddenly ill while returning from a sea voyage, and died after about two weeks of care.
- Seth Wyman, Levi’s father, had not requested the services and had no prior dealings with Mills.
- After the expenses were incurred, Seth Wyman wrote Mills a letter on February 24, 1821 promising to pay the expenses Mills had incurred for Levi.

## Issues

1. Whether a subsequent promise to pay for past, voluntary services rendered to the promisor’s adult child is enforceable when the promise rests only on moral obligation and no prior legal duty existed.

## Decision

- The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed a nonsuit for the defendant.
- The court held Seth Wyman’s promise unenforceable for lack of consideration.
- The court entered judgment for costs for the defendant.

## Legal Principles

- Past, voluntary services are not valid consideration for a later promise to pay for them.
- Moral obligation alone does not supply consideration for an executory promise unless it is tied to a prior legal or equitable obligation that once existed and later became unenforceable by operation of law.
- A parent’s moral duty to aid an adult child does not create a legal duty to reimburse a third party who voluntarily provided assistance without the parent’s request.
- A completed gift is legally distinct from a promise to make a gift; a mere promise to pay, without consideration, is not enforceable as a contract.

## Conclusion

The court refused to enforce a father’s written promise to reimburse a stranger for care voluntarily provided to the father’s adult son because the promise was supported only by moral obligation and past benefits, not by consideration or any antecedent legal duty.


Mills v. Wyman, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 207 (Mass. 1825)