## Facts

- A young woman who had worked for the Peace Corps lived in Washington, D.C., and rented a car from Hertz there, listing her D.C. apartment as her address on the rental agreement.
- By signing the Hertz rental agreement, she became covered by a liability-insurance policy that Royal Indemnity Company had issued to Hertz.
- Neither Hertz nor Royal Indemnity was incorporated in the District of Columbia, but both did business in the District and were subject to suit there.
- The woman drove the rented car toward her family home in New York but was killed in a collision in Pennsylvania.
- The collision also killed her passenger and a married couple from Illinois; a minor child traveling with the Illinois couple survived but was seriously injured.
- The administrator of the Illinois couple’s estates filed a petition in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (acting in probate) seeking issuance of letters to a local, disinterested ancillary administrator so the Illinois estates and the injured child could sue the woman’s estate in the District.
- The district court appointed Toomey as ancillary administrator for that purpose.
- The woman’s father, acting as administrator of her estate, appeared to oppose the appointment, arguing that his daughter’s meaningful connections with D.C. had ended before her death and that any wrongful-death litigation could proceed in New York or Pennsylvania (and actions had been filed in Pennsylvania and in D.C.).
- The district court concluded that the decedent’s interest in the liability-insurance protection constituted personal estate with a situs in the District of Columbia, supporting ancillary administration; the father appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether the protection against liability provided by the Hertz/Royal Indemnity insurance arrangement, with Hertz and the insurer doing business and suable in the District, constitutes an estate “asset” located in the District sufficient to support appointment of an ancillary administrator in D.C.
2. Whether the decedent’s alleged lack of continuing ties to the District, or the existence of alternative forums for tort litigation, defeats the District’s probate authority to appoint an ancillary administrator.

## Decision

- The court affirmed the order appointing Toomey as ancillary administrator.
- The court treated the decedent’s interest in the liability-insurance protection arising from the D.C. rental transaction as personal estate and accepted that it could be viewed as located in the District for purposes of ancillary probate.
- Because Hertz and Royal Indemnity did business in the District and were amenable to suit there, the insurance protection had a sufficient connection to the District to qualify as a local asset supporting probate jurisdiction.
- The decedent’s domicile and the claimed availability of other forums did not eliminate the probate court’s power to appoint an ancillary administrator once a local estate interest was found.

## Legal Principles

- A decedent’s interest in liability-insurance protection may be treated as an estate asset for ancillary administration where the obligation is connected to, and enforceable in, the forum.
- Ancillary probate jurisdiction turns on the presence of an estate asset within the forum, not on whether the forum is the decedent’s domicile.
- A probate court may appoint an ancillary administrator to permit claimants to pursue estate-related litigation in the forum when the estate has a local asset to be administered.
- The fact that related tort suits could be filed elsewhere does not, by itself, bar ancillary administration in a jurisdiction that has a forum-based estate asset.

## Conclusion

Milmoe v. Toomey upheld the District of Columbia’s authority to appoint an ancillary administrator where the only local estate interest was the decedent’s liability-insurance protection created by a D.C. Hertz rental and tied to businesses subject to suit in the District; alternative forums and disputed D.C. ties did not defeat probate jurisdiction once that local asset was identified.


Milmoe v. Toomey, 123 U.S. App. D.C. 40, 356 F.R.D. 793 (1966)