## Facts

- R.T. McFerrin was killed when his automobile collided with a passenger train at a rural grade crossing (“Center Oak Crossing”) in Bell County, Texas, around 2:00 p.m. on January 31, 1953.
- The train was traveling about 55–60 miles per hour.
- The suit was a wrongful death action brought by McFerrin’s widow on behalf of herself and their eight minor children.
- A railroad fireman was the only eyewitness and testified McFerrin did not stop before entering the crossing.
- Plaintiffs offered the widow’s testimony that McFerrin habitually stopped at that crossing on other occasions to support an inference that he stopped on the day of the collision.
- The statutory provision at issue required a driver to stop within 50 to 15 feet of the nearest rail when an approaching train is “plainly visible” and “in hazardous proximity.”

## Issues

1. Whether the evidence conclusively established that the statutory conditions existed (train “plainly visible” and “in hazardous proximity”), making McFerrin contributorily negligent as a matter of law for failing to stop.
2. Whether testimony that the decedent habitually stopped at the crossing was admissible to prove he stopped at the time of the collision where there was eyewitness testimony of the event, and if inadmissible, whether the error was harmful.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court of Texas held the railroad was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on contributory negligence because the statutory duty to stop arises only if the statutory conditions are met, and whether they were met was a fact question on this record.
- The Court held it was error to admit the widow’s habit testimony to prove McFerrin stopped on the occasion in question in the presence of eyewitness testimony describing the collision.
- The Court held the evidentiary error was harmful because it bore directly on the disputed contributory-negligence issue and likely influenced the jury’s finding.
- The Court reversed the judgments below and remanded for a new trial.

## Legal Principles

- A railroad-crossing statute requiring a motorist to stop applies only upon specified conditions; it does not impose an absolute duty to stop at every crossing.
- Whether a train is “plainly visible” and “in hazardous proximity” is determined from the facts and circumstances as they reasonably appeared to a reasonably prudent driver when the decision to stop or proceed had to be made, not by hindsight from the occurrence of a collision.
- Habit or custom evidence offered to prove conduct on a specific occasion may be inadmissible when there is direct eyewitness testimony of the event, especially where the habit evidence would serve to contradict or bolster proof on a sharply contested point.
- Erroneous admission of evidence warrants reversal when it concerns a material disputed issue and probably affected the verdict.

## Conclusion

The Texas Supreme Court rejected the claim that the decedent’s statutory violation and contributory negligence were established as a matter of law, but ordered a new trial because the jury was improperly allowed to infer compliance from habit testimony despite conflicting eyewitness testimony on the central question whether the decedent stopped before entering the crossing.


Missouri-Kansas-Texas R.R. Co. of Tex. v. McFerrin, 291 S.W.2d 931 (Tex. 1956)