Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985)

Facts

  • In 1970, Attorney General John N. Mitchell authorized a warrantless wiretap to gather intelligence about a domestic group viewed as threatening national security.
  • The wiretap was placed on the telephone of an antiwar organizer; the government intercepted three conversations involving Keith Forsyth.
  • In 1972, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not permit warrantless wiretaps for domestic national-security threats.
  • Forsyth later sued Mitchell for damages, alleging violations of the Fourth Amendment and Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act.
  • The district court granted summary judgment for Forsyth on liability and rejected Mitchell’s claims of absolute and qualified immunity.
  • The court of appeals agreed Mitchell lacked absolute immunity but held the denial of qualified immunity was not immediately appealable.
  • The Supreme Court granted review to decide whether the Attorney General had absolute immunity, whether denial of qualified immunity is immediately appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and whether Mitchell was entitled to qualified immunity.

Issues

  1. Whether the Attorney General is absolutely immune from damages suits for allegedly unconstitutional domestic national-security wiretapping authorized while in office.
  2. Whether a district court’s denial of qualified immunity is an immediately appealable “final decision” under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (collateral order doctrine).
  3. Whether Mitchell was entitled to qualified immunity because the illegality of warrantless domestic-security wiretaps was not clearly established in 1970.

Decision

  • The Court held Mitchell was not absolutely immune from damages liability for the challenged national-security wiretap authorization.
  • The Court held denial of a substantial qualified-immunity claim is immediately appealable as a collateral order under § 1291.
  • Applying qualified-immunity standards, the Court held Mitchell was entitled to qualified immunity because, in 1970, a reasonable official could have believed the wiretap was lawful given unsettled law.
  • Absolute immunity is limited to a narrow set of functions with strong historical and structural justifications; Cabinet status alone does not justify absolute immunity.
  • Qualified immunity protects officials performing discretionary functions from damages unless they violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights a reasonable person would have known.
  • Qualified immunity is an entitlement to avoid trial and the burdens of litigation when applicable, not merely a defense to liability after adjudication.
  • Denial of qualified immunity is immediately appealable when it conclusively determines the immunity question, is separate from the merits, and would be effectively unreviewable after final judgment.

Conclusion

The Court rejected absolute immunity for the Attorney General’s domestic national-security wiretapping decisions, established that denials of qualified immunity are immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine, and held Mitchell was shielded by qualified immunity because the governing law was not clearly established at the time of the 1970 wiretap authorization.