## Facts

- Ten-year-old Darion Mitchell was injured when his bicycle was struck by a minivan driven by Albert Roy, Jr.
- Darion’s mother, Delisa Mitchell, sued Roy seeking damages for Darion’s injuries, alleging Roy was speeding when the collision occurred.
- The case was tried to the bench.
- At trial, eyewitness Angela Dodd testified that she saw the collision from her front yard and estimated Roy was traveling about 35–40 miles per hour in a 25-mile-per-hour zone.
- Dodd explained that her estimate was based on her everyday experience driving at different speeds and her observation that the minivan kicked up dust on the street.
- Roy objected to Dodd’s speed testimony, arguing it was not rationally based on her perception, that a seated and stationary observer could not reliably estimate speed, and that Dodd’s account conflicted with other testimony (including a police investigator).
- The trial court overruled the objection, stating that Dodd was not being offered as an expert and that the court would treat her testimony as lay opinion.
- The trial court ruled for Mitchell, finding Roy 100% at fault, stating that the conclusion was based primarily on Dodd’s testimony about Roy’s speed.
- Roy appealed, arguing the trial court erred by admitting Dodd’s lay opinion estimate of his speed.

## Issues

1. Whether the trial court erred by admitting an eyewitness’s lay opinion estimating the vehicle’s speed, where the witness was not an expert and observed the vehicle from a stationary position.

## Decision

- The court of appeal held that the trial court did not commit reversible error in allowing Dodd to give lay opinion testimony estimating Roy’s speed.
- The court reasoned that a non-expert witness may give an opinion on speed when the opinion is based on the witness’s personal observations and ordinary driving experience; challenges to accuracy generally affect weight, not admissibility.
- The judgment in favor of Mitchell was affirmed.

## Legal Principles

- Under Louisiana evidence rules governing lay opinion testimony, a non-expert’s opinion is admissible when it is rationally based on the witness’s perception and helpful to understanding the witness’s testimony or deciding a fact in issue.
- Estimating a vehicle’s speed is a type of opinion that lay witnesses may give when grounded in firsthand observation and common experience (such as routine experience driving and comparing speeds).
- Disputes about a lay witness’s opportunity to observe, the method used to estimate speed, or inconsistencies with other testimony usually go to the weight the factfinder should give the testimony, not whether the testimony may be heard.
- A trial court has broad discretion in evidentiary rulings on lay opinion testimony; an appellate court will not disturb that ruling absent an abuse of discretion.
- In a bench trial, the judge as factfinder may admit lay opinion testimony and then assign it whatever weight the judge finds appropriate in light of the whole record.

## Conclusion

Mitchell v. Roy involved a bicycle–minivan collision where the plaintiff relied heavily on an eyewitness’s estimate that the driver was traveling above the posted speed limit. The court of appeal upheld the trial court’s decision to admit the eyewitness’s speed estimate as lay opinion based on personal observation and ordinary driving experience, concluding that objections about the witness’s position, method, or inconsistencies affected credibility and weight rather than admissibility, and it affirmed the judgment finding the driver solely at fault.


Mitchell v. Roy, 51 So. 3d 153 (2010)