Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25 (1973)

Facts

  • Rockey Moore was charged with murder in Arizona while incarcerated in California.
  • Arizona lodged a detainer against Moore but did not promptly bring him to trial.
  • Nearly three years passed between the charge and Moore’s eventual trial in Arizona.
  • During the delay, Moore repeatedly demanded that Arizona extradite him for trial or remove the detainer.
  • Before trial, Moore sought state habeas relief, alleging a violation of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to a speedy trial.

Issues

  1. Whether a defendant must affirmatively show prejudice to the defense at trial as a necessary condition to establish a federal constitutional speedy-trial violation.
  2. Whether the state court applied the correct constitutional standard for evaluating a speedy-trial claim involving an incarcerated defendant subject to an out-of-state detainer.

Decision

  • The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacated the Arizona Supreme Court’s judgment, and remanded.
  • The Court held the Arizona Supreme Court committed fundamental error by treating prejudice to the trial defense as an essential prerequisite to a speedy-trial claim.
  • The Court directed reconsideration under the Barker v. Wingo multi-factor balancing approach, including scrutiny of the reasons for delay and the State’s diligence in seeking trial of an incarcerated defendant.
  • Speedy-trial claims are evaluated by balancing factors identified in Barker v. Wingo: length of delay, reason for delay, defendant’s assertion of the right, and prejudice to the defendant.
  • No single Barker factor is necessary or sufficient; courts must consider them together in a sensitive, circumstance-specific balance.
  • Prejudice from delay is not limited to impairment of the defense at trial; it includes restraints on liberty, anxiety, disruption of life, and for incarcerated defendants, potential effects on parole and rehabilitation.
  • When a defendant is imprisoned in another jurisdiction and demands trial, the prosecuting state must make a diligent, good-faith effort to bring the defendant to trial and courts must weigh the reasons for any delay.

Conclusion

The Court ruled that Arizona used an improper speedy-trial standard by requiring affirmative proof of trial-defense prejudice and remanded for application of the Barker balancing test, including the State’s responsibility to pursue trial diligently despite the defendant’s incarceration elsewhere.