## Facts

- Randy Joseph Moore, an Oregon prisoner, was investigated for the killing of Kenneth Rogers.
- Moore initially went to the police station voluntarily, gave an account minimizing his involvement, and was released with instructions to return the next day with his brother, Raymond.
- When Moore returned, officers invoked Raymond’s prior cooperation in another case and promised Moore that, if he cooperated, he would receive “a deal just like Raymond had received.”
- Before recording a statement, an officer instructed Moore to state on tape that his confession was voluntary; Moore complied and then gave a taped confession describing the shooting as occurring when Rogers stumbled into him and his gun discharged.
- Moore was charged with felony murder and pleaded guilty; he received Oregon’s mandatory 25-year sentence.
- Trial counsel did not file a motion to suppress the confession.
- In later federal habeas proceedings, the State conceded the confession was unconstitutionally obtained and did not contest the finding that it was involuntary.

## Issues

1. Whether counsel performed deficiently under Strickland by failing to move to suppress an involuntary confession induced by a promise of leniency.
2. Whether Moore was prejudiced under Hill v. Lockhart—i.e., whether there was a reasonable probability that, absent counsel’s error, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on trial.
3. Whether the state courts’ rejection of the ineffective-assistance claim was an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

## Decision

- The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court and granted habeas relief.
- The court held counsel’s failure to seek suppression of the involuntary confession was objectively unreasonable and constituted deficient performance.
- The court held Moore showed prejudice because there was a reasonable probability that, without the confession, he would have rejected the plea and gone to trial.
- The court concluded the state courts’ denial of the ineffective-assistance claim unreasonably applied clearly established federal law.

## Legal Principles

- Under Strickland v. Washington, ineffective assistance requires deficient performance (outside the range of reasonable professional assistance) and resulting prejudice.
- Police-induced confessions obtained through promises of leniency can be involuntary and inadmissible under due process principles; competent counsel must recognize and litigate a plainly meritorious suppression issue.
- In the guilty-plea context, prejudice is assessed under Hill v. Lockhart: whether there is a reasonable probability the defendant would have insisted on trial but for counsel’s error.
- Under AEDPA, federal habeas relief is available when a state-court decision is contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent, not merely incorrect.

## Conclusion

The Ninth Circuit held that failing to move to suppress a conceded involuntary confession was objectively unreasonable and prejudicial where the confession materially drove the defendant’s decision to plead guilty, making the state courts’ rejection of the claim an unreasonable application of Strickland and Hill under § 2254(d).


Moore v. Czerniak, 574 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 2009)