Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986)

Facts

  • Brian K. Burbine was arrested in Cranston, Rhode Island, on a breaking and entering/burglary charge and held in custody.
  • Police developed information linking him to a separate Providence homicide, and Providence officers came to the Cranston station to question him.
  • Burbine’s sister contacted the Public Defender’s Office to obtain counsel for him on the burglary charge.
  • An assistant public defender called the Cranston detective division and stated she would represent Burbine if police intended to question him; police told her he would not be questioned further until the next day.
  • Police did not tell the attorney that Burbine was a murder suspect or that Providence officers were present to interrogate him that evening.
  • That night, Providence officers interrogated Burbine in multiple sessions, each preceded by Miranda warnings and written waivers.
  • Burbine signed three written confessions admitting to the murder.
  • Burbine did not know an attorney had called on his behalf and never requested counsel during questioning.

Issues

  1. Whether police failure to inform a suspect that an attorney had called on his behalf, and misleading the attorney about planned questioning, renders an otherwise valid Miranda waiver involuntary or unknowing under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
  2. Whether police conduct preventing or delaying attorney contact violates the Sixth Amendment right to counsel when the suspect has not yet been formally charged with the offense under interrogation.
  3. Whether deception directed at defense counsel, in these circumstances, is so offensive as to violate Fourteenth Amendment due process and require exclusion of the confessions.

Decision

  • The Supreme Court reversed the First Circuit in a 6–3 decision and upheld admission of Burbine’s confessions.
  • The Court held the Miranda waivers were knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because Burbine received proper warnings and chose to speak without coercion; undisclosed events outside his knowledge did not invalidate the waivers.
  • The Court found no Sixth Amendment violation because adversary judicial proceedings had not begun on the murder offense, so the right to counsel had not attached.
  • The Court held the police deception toward the attorney, though improper, did not reach the level of a due process violation requiring suppression.
  • A Miranda waiver is valid if it is the product of a free and deliberate choice and is made with awareness of the rights abandoned and the consequences of abandonment.
  • Facts unknown to the suspect—such as a lawyer’s attempt to contact or represent the suspect—do not affect whether the suspect knowingly and voluntarily waived Miranda rights.
  • The Constitution does not require police, as part of Miranda, to inform a suspect that an attorney has called or to inform the attorney that interrogation will occur.
  • The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense-specific and attaches only upon initiation of formal adversary proceedings (e.g., charge, indictment, arraignment); it does not attach merely because a suspect is in custody or counsel is available.
  • Due process exclusion for police misconduct requires conduct so offensive to a civilized system of justice that it warrants condemnation independent of Miranda compliance; deception aimed at counsel, without coercing the suspect, may be insufficient.

Conclusion

The Court held that police compliance with Miranda can support a valid waiver even if officers conceal an attorney’s efforts to reach the suspect and mislead the attorney, and that neither the Sixth Amendment (pre-charge) nor due process required suppression on these facts.