## Facts

- Mark Morehead, a union carpenter/harbor worker, worked for Atkinson-Kiewit, J/V (A-K) on the Jamestown Bridge construction project in Narragansett Bay, Rhode Island.
- A-K used flat-deck construction barges and tugs to move equipment and materials; the barges functioned largely as floating work platforms.
- A-K was both (1) Morehead’s employer and (2) the bareboat charterer of the barge involved, making it the statutory “vessel” owner for LHWCA purposes.
- Because tug crews could not handle certain lines under union rules, A-K assigned its carpenters, including Morehead, to perform line-handling tasks.
- While Morehead attempted to catch a line thrown by another A-K carpenter, he stepped into an open hatch that was not apparent and fell, sustaining injuries.
- Morehead pursued a negligence claim against A-K under LHWCA § 905(b), suing A-K only in its capacity as “vessel.”

## Issues

1. Whether a dual-capacity defendant that is both employer and statutory vessel owner may be liable under LHWCA § 905(b) when the alleged negligence arises from conduct attributable to its employer functions rather than vessel functions.
2. How the vessel-duty framework associated with *Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. De Los Santos* applies in determining whether the complained-of conduct is “vessel” negligence in a dual-capacity setting.

## Decision

- The en banc First Circuit affirmed dismissal of the § 905(b) action.
- The court held A-K could be sued as a “vessel” only for negligence committed in its vessel capacity, not for negligence tied to employer responsibilities covered exclusively by LHWCA compensation.
- The court concluded the alleged failures concerning the open hatch and warnings were part of A-K’s organization and supervision of its employees’ work, and therefore were employer-side, not vessel-side, negligence.

## Legal Principles

- LHWCA workers’ compensation is the exclusive remedy against an employer for workplace injuries; § 905(b) preserves only a limited negligence action against “the vessel.”
- A dual-capacity entity may face § 905(b) liability only for negligence attributable to vessel-related duties, not for employer-direction, supervision, or worksite-safety failures merely because the injury occurred on a vessel.
- In a dual-capacity analysis informed by *Scindia*, the court must separate employer functions from vessel duties; allowing ordinary employer negligence to be recharacterized as vessel negligence would defeat the statutory exclusivity scheme.

## Conclusion

The en banc court held that § 905(b) does not permit a harbor worker to obtain tort recovery from a dual-capacity employer where the claimed negligence concerns employer-controlled work methods and workplace safety, rather than breach of vessel duties; Morehead’s remedy against A-K remained limited to LHWCA compensation.


Morehead v. Atkinson-Kiewit, J/V, 97 F.3d 603 (1st Cir. 1996) (en banc)