## Facts

- Neighboring ranch owners in Live Oak County, Texas treated a winding road as their boundary until the road was straightened in 1949, leaving small tracts of each ranch on the other side of the new road.
- To avoid crossing the highway to reach the isolated tracts, the parties exchanged the surface estates of the mislocated strips.
- Each 1949 deed conveyed the surface while reserving “all of the oil, gas, and other minerals of every kind and character” and accompanying easements for mineral exploration and production.
- Uranium deposits were later discovered beneath the 6.77-acre tract whose surface was owned by the Mosers, while the mineral estate had been reserved by the Gefferts and later leased/assigned to United States Steel.
- The surface owners asserted uranium belonged to the surface estate because of its proximity to the surface and the surface impacts of mining; the mineral owners asserted uranium was included within the reserved “other minerals.”

## Issues

1. Whether uranium is included in a deed reservation of “oil, gas, and other minerals of every kind and character.”
2. Whether Texas should continue to classify substances as “surface” or “mineral” based on the Acker–Reed “surface destruction” doctrine.
3. If the classification rule is changed, whether and how the change applies to preexisting severances and transactions.

## Decision

- The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the judgment for the mineral owners.
- The court held uranium is a “mineral” in ordinary and commercial usage and is included within a broad reservation of “oil, gas, and other minerals of every kind and character,” absent contrary intent shown by the instrument or circumstances.
- The court rejected the Acker–Reed “surface destruction” test as the controlling method for defining mineral versus surface ownership for future severances.
- To protect settled property expectations, the court limited the effect of the doctrinal change by applying the former approach only to severances occurring before the decision’s effective date.

## Legal Principles

- A grant or reservation of “oil, gas, and other minerals” is generally construed to include substances regarded as minerals in ordinary and commercial meaning, unless the instrument’s language or surrounding circumstances show a contrary intent.
- Ownership classification should not turn on whether a reasonable extraction method would substantially destroy the surface; disputes about surface impacts are addressed through surface-use limits, implied rights, and related doctrines rather than reallocating title.
- When a court changes a property-classification rule on which parties have relied in structuring transactions, the court may limit retroactive effect to avoid disrupting settled titles and valuations.
- Uranium is treated as a mineral included within broad “other minerals” language absent an express or clearly implied exclusion.

## Conclusion

The court upheld mineral-estate title to uranium under a broad mineral reservation, while prospectively discarding the surface-destruction doctrine as the basis for defining mineral versus surface ownership and limiting the reach of the new approach to protect reliance interests tied to earlier severances.


Moser v. United States Steel Corp., 676 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. 1984)