Moviematic Indus. Corp. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 349 So. 2d 667 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977)

Facts

  • Moviematic Industries Corporation owned about 1,200 acres of undeveloped land in unincorporated west Dade County, Florida.
  • The property was zoned IU-2 (heavy industrial) and had a special exception allowing business-airport uses.
  • The land sat over the Biscayne Aquifer, a major source of county drinking water.
  • In 1974, the County imposed a temporary building moratorium over a large area, including the property, to complete a comprehensive study aimed at protecting the freshwater supply and related ecosystems.
  • After the study, county departments recommended rezoning the property from IU-2 to GU (an interim general-use classification allowing single-family residences on minimum five-acre lots) and terminating the airport-related special exception.
  • Following a public hearing with expert testimony supporting the change and opposition evidence from Moviematic, the County adopted Resolution Z-115-75 implementing the rezoning and terminating the special exception.
  • Moviematic contended the new classification and water-protection constraints left it without an economically viable use.

Issues

  1. Whether the rezoning and termination of the special exception bore a reasonable relationship to public health, safety, morals, or general welfare, or instead constituted arbitrary and unreasonable action.
  2. Whether the rezoning imposed such an extreme restriction on the property’s beneficial use that it amounted to an uncompensated taking under the United States and Florida Constitutions.

Decision

  • The District Court of Appeal affirmed the circuit court’s denial of certiorari and left Resolution Z-115-75 in effect.
  • The court held the downzoning and termination of the special exception were reasonably related to protecting the county’s freshwater supply and environmental conditions and thus were a valid exercise of the police power.
  • The court rejected the takings claim because the GU classification still permitted reasonable use (including low-density residential development), and the regulation did not approach confiscation.
  • Local zoning enactments are presumed valid; the challenger bears the burden to show the regulation is arbitrary, unreasonable, or confiscatory.
  • A zoning change satisfies substantive due process if it is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, including protection of public drinking-water sources and environmental resources.
  • A regulation does not constitute a taking merely because it reduces property value or eliminates the most profitable use; a taking typically requires near-total deprivation of reasonable economic use.

Conclusion

The court upheld the County’s environmentally motivated downzoning of land over a critical aquifer and found no unconstitutional taking where the property retained permissible residential uses under the new zoning classification.