## Facts

- A group of Cuban migrants traveled by boat toward Florida; the vessel became unseaworthy near the Florida Keys.
- Some migrants climbed onto the American Shoal Lighthouse, a federally owned navigational structure located in open water about seven miles from shore; others remained on the boat or in the water.
- The U.S. Coast Guard interdicted the group at or near the Lighthouse and transported them to a Coast Guard cutter.
- Plaintiffs (an advocacy organization, migrants, and relatives) claimed the Lighthouse constituted U.S. “dry land,” triggering favorable processing under the executive “Wet-Foot/Dry-Foot” policy associated with Cuban migration.
- DHS and the Coast Guard treated the encounter as a “wet foot” interdiction and prepared to repatriate or process the migrants offshore.
- Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent repatriation and require “dry foot” treatment.

## Issues

1. Whether migrants who physically reached the American Shoal Lighthouse were on U.S. “dry land” for purposes of the government’s Cuban migration policy and related statutory authority.
2. Whether DHS/Coast Guard’s classification of the incident as a “wet foot” interdiction was arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law under the Administrative Procedure Act.
3. Whether the migrants’ contact with the Lighthouse gave them enforceable constitutional rights to admission, parole, or additional procedural protections.
4. Whether plaintiffs satisfied the requirements for a preliminary injunction, especially a substantial likelihood of success on the merits.

## Decision

- The court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction.
- Plaintiffs failed to show a substantial likelihood of success that the Lighthouse was “dry land” within the relevant immigration framework.
- The court found the government’s treatment of the Lighthouse as offshore navigational infrastructure, rather than a point of U.S. entry akin to land, to be reasonable.
- The court concluded plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on APA claims challenging the government’s interpretation and application of its interdiction policies.
- The court rejected the argument that brief presence on the Lighthouse conferred constitutional rights to enter or remain in the United States.
- Considering the equities and public interest, the court declined to order relief that would interfere with executive control over immigration enforcement and foreign-affairs-sensitive maritime interdiction.

## Legal Principles

- A preliminary injunction requires, at minimum, a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; serious alleged harm does not justify relief absent a viable legal claim.
- In immigration enforcement and maritime interdiction, courts generally defer to reasonable executive interpretations and applications of policies tied to border control and foreign affairs.
- “Dry land” under executive Cuban migration policy may reasonably be limited to actual U.S. land territory (including islands) rather than extending to any man-made structure within territorial waters.
- Noncitizens interdicted outside the United States or at the threshold of entry generally have limited constitutional protections regarding admission, parole, and exclusion decisions.
- Agency action is not arbitrary or capricious where it is consistent with existing policies, grounded in a reasonable interpretation of operative terms, and not contrary to the governing statute.

## Conclusion

The court refused to block repatriation or require “dry foot” processing because plaintiffs did not show that reaching an offshore lighthouse transformed a maritime interdiction into entry onto U.S. “dry land,” and the government’s contrary determination was reasonable and entitled to deference at the preliminary-injunction stage.


Movimiento Democracia, Inc. v. Johnson, 193 F. Supp. 3d 1353 (S.D. Fla. 2016)