## Facts

- A publisher and its principal contracted to publish a memoir presented by the author as a true Holocaust survival account, and retained a French-fluent professional writer to assist with the American edition.
- The memoir was widely published and exploited through additional rights, including a film adaptation.
- The author and co-author later sued the publisher and its principal for breach of contract and for unfair and deceptive practices under Massachusetts law, alleging underpayment of royalties and related misconduct.
- A 2002 jury returned large compensatory awards for both plaintiffs, and the trial judge trebled damages under the consumer-protection statute, producing a judgment exceeding $30 million; the judgment was affirmed on appeal in 2005.
- In 2008, the publisher and its principal filed an independent action seeking relief from the judgment, alleging the author’s memoir narrative was fabricated and that the prior verdict was procured through false pleadings and testimony that went to the foundation of the claims.
- The Superior Court dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6), ruling the action was time-barred, lacked extraordinary circumstances, and failed to plead fraud on the court; the publisher and principal appealed.

## Issues

1. Whether an independent action for relief from judgment is barred by the one-year time limit applicable to certain Rule 60(b) motions or by analogous limitations principles.
2. Whether allegations that the prior case rested on a fabricated life story, presented as true in pleadings and testimony, can constitute the extraordinary fraud required to support an independent equitable action and survive a motion to dismiss.
3. Whether the independent action stated a viable claim against the co-author/translator as well as the author.

## Decision

- The Appeals Court reversed the dismissal as to the author and reinstated the independent action for further proceedings.
- The Appeals Court affirmed the dismissal as to the co-author/translator.
- The court held the one-year deadline for Rule 60(b)(2)–(3) motions did not automatically bar a properly pleaded independent action in equity.
- The allegations against the author, accepted as true at the pleading stage, described an extraordinary fraud that permeated the prior case and could warrant equitable relief from the judgment.
- The complaint did not plead facts showing the co-author knew of, participated in, or committed a comparable fraud; as to her, the filing functioned as an improper attempt to reopen issues already litigated.

## Legal Principles

- An independent action for relief from judgment is an exceptional equitable remedy preserved alongside Rule 60(b) motions and is reserved for gross injustices that may justify departure from ordinary finality and preclusion rules.
- The one-year time limit for Rule 60(b)(2) and (3) motions does not, by itself, foreclose an independent action; timeliness is governed by equitable considerations, including laches and diligence, and the plaintiff must show the absence of an adequate legal remedy.
- At the motion-to-dismiss stage, a court must accept well-pleaded factual allegations as true and determine only whether the pleaded facts, if proved, could justify the extraordinary relief sought.
- Claims of “fraud on the court” are narrowly confined, but allegations that a lawsuit and resulting massive judgment were built on a fabricated foundational narrative may be sufficient to proceed in an independent action.
- A defendant-specific showing is required: relief may proceed against a party plausibly alleged to have committed the extraordinary fraud, but not against another party absent well-pleaded facts of knowledge, participation, or comparable misconduct.

## Conclusion

The court permitted an independent equitable action to proceed against the author where the complaint alleged a pervasive fabrication that formed the basis of a prior multimillion-dollar judgment, while preserving finality for the co-author because the pleading did not allege her involvement in the asserted fraud.


Mt. Ivy Press, L.P. v. Defonseca, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 340, 937 N.E.2d 501 (2010)