Mueller v. Swift, No. 15-cv-01937-WJM, 2017 WL 3058027 (D. Colo. July 18, 2017)

Facts

  • During a June 2, 2013 backstage meet-and-greet photo in Denver, Taylor Swift alleged David Mueller intentionally reached under her skirt and grabbed her buttocks without consent.
  • Swift promptly reported the incident to her mother, tour personnel, and security; Mueller was confronted and escorted out.
  • Mueller’s employer (a Denver radio station) investigated and terminated him two days later.
  • Mueller denied the alleged touching and claimed any contact was incidental.
  • Mueller sued Swift, Andrea Swift, and Frank Bell, alleging their statements and communications caused his firing and harmed his career; he sought roughly $3 million.
  • Swift counterclaimed against Mueller for assault and battery, seeking $1 in nominal damages.
  • In connection with the station’s post-incident meeting, Mueller made an audio recording, later produced only edited excerpts, and asserted the original was lost after computer and drive problems.

Issues

  1. Whether an adverse-inference jury instruction is appropriate for spoliation of evidence without a finding that the evidence was destroyed in bad faith.
  2. What sanction, if any, is appropriate when evidence is lost and the record does not clearly show intentional destruction.
  3. What evidentiary limits apply to a plaintiff’s testimony and proof of future lost-income damages, including the requirement of reasonable certainty and restrictions on lay witnesses offering expert-style opinions.
  4. Whether a defendant who reports perceived misconduct to a third party can be held liable for tortious interference absent evidence of improper conduct.

Decision

  • The court declined to impose an adverse-inference instruction regarding the missing portions of Mueller’s recording because bad faith was not clearly established.
  • The court imposed a lesser remedy by permitting extensive cross-examination about the recording, its editing, and its loss.
  • The court restricted speculative damages proof, emphasizing that lost profits must be supported by admissible evidence showing reasonable certainty and limiting unsupported expert-like testimony by lay witnesses.
  • At trial, the court granted judgment as a matter of law on Mueller’s claims against Taylor Swift individually.
  • The jury found Mueller committed assault and battery against Swift and awarded $1 in nominal damages, and it rejected Mueller’s interference claims against Andrea Swift and Frank Bell.
  • An adverse-inference sanction for spoliation generally requires a showing of bad-faith destruction; negligence or carelessness alone is insufficient for that instruction.
  • When bad faith is not shown, a court may address potential prejudice through narrower measures, including allowing targeted cross-examination about missing evidence and its loss.
  • Future lost-profit damages must be proven with reasonable certainty; unsupported assertions about prospective opportunities do not satisfy that standard.
  • A party’s report of perceived misconduct, without proof of knowingly false statements or improper pressure, is insufficient to establish tortious interference merely because an employer later terminates an employee.

Conclusion

The court’s central pretrial ruling held that spoliation does not justify an adverse-inference instruction absent bad faith, favoring less severe trial tools to test credibility and mitigate prejudice, while requiring non-speculative proof of claimed economic losses; the case ultimately concluded with a jury finding battery and awarding Swift $1 in nominal damages and rejecting Mueller’s interference claims.