## Facts

- Dora B. Mugaas owned land adjoining Delmar C. Smith and his wife; the dispute concerned a boundary strip about 135 feet long and up to 3.5 feet wide.
- Around 1910, a fence was built that enclosed the strip as part of Mugaas’s side of the boundary.
- From about 1910 to 1928, Mugaas and her predecessors used and possessed the strip as their own while the fence remained and was maintained.
- After about 1928, the fence deteriorated and was not replaced, leaving no clear, visible marker of the earlier boundary enclosure.
- In 1941, Smith bought the adjoining parcel under a deed description that included the strip, and at purchase time he saw no visible signs (such as a fence) indicating Mugaas claimed it.
- Smith later built improvements that encroached onto the strip.
- Mugaas sued to quiet title to the strip and sought removal of the encroachments.

## Issues

1. Whether the evidence supported the finding that Mugaas had acquired title to the strip by adverse possession before Smith’s 1941 purchase.
2. Whether a title fully vested by adverse possession can be lost by later abandonment, inaction, or removal/deterioration of boundary markers.
3. Whether Washington recording statutes protect a bona fide purchaser of record title against a prior, unrecorded title obtained by adverse possession.
4. Whether Mugaas was estopped from asserting title based on her conduct or alleged statements.

## Decision

- The Washington Supreme Court affirmed the judgment for Mugaas.
- The evidence supported the trial court’s finding that Mugaas had acquired title to the strip by adverse possession by at least 1928.
- A title perfected by adverse possession is not divested by parol abandonment, verbal relinquishment, or other acts short of what would be required to transfer deeded title.
- The recording statutes did not apply to adverse-possession titles; Smith’s status as a bona fide purchaser of record title did not extinguish Mugaas’s vested adverse-possession title.
- The asserted statutory protection for bona fide purchasers was construed as directed to undisclosed community property interests and did not extend to possessory titles.
- Estoppel was rejected because disturbing real-property title by estoppel requires clear and convincing proof, which was not shown.

## Legal Principles

- Whether possession over the statutory period meets adverse-possession requirements is a fact question; trial-court findings receive substantial deference on review.
- Once adverse possession ripens into title, the title is vested and stands on the same level as deeded title for purposes of divestiture.
- Perfected adverse-possession title cannot be lost by mere abandonment, cessation of visible occupation, or informal statements; divestiture requires a transfer or equivalent act required for deeded title.
- Recording statutes aimed at unrecorded conveyances do not defeat title acquired by adverse possession, and a later bona fide purchaser of record title takes subject to the perfected adverse-possession title.
- Estoppel against assertion of real-property title requires clear and convincing evidence and must be properly supported by pleading and proof.

## Conclusion

The court upheld quiet title for Mugaas, holding that her adverse possession had vested title before Smith bought under record title, that the vested title was not lost by later disappearance of the fence or reduced visibility of her claim, that recording statutes did not protect Smith against the adverse-possession title, and that estoppel was not established.


Mugaas v. Smith, 33 Wn.2d 429, 206 P.2d 332 (Wash. 1949)