## Facts

- Abidan Muhammad filed a pro se employment-discrimination complaint against Wal-Mart Stores East, L.P. in the Western District of New York using a form complaint.
- On the form, Muhammad indicated Title VII and ADA as statutory bases and checked only “disability” as the alleged basis of discrimination; he did not check “sex.”
- The complaint’s narrative described events tied to a hand injury, leave, and reassignment; it did not expressly allege sex discrimination.
- After discovery, Wal-Mart moved for summary judgment; attorney Christina A. Agola appeared for Muhammad and filed opposition papers.
- In the opposition, Agola asserted that Muhammad had “clearly pled” a gender-discrimination claim and argued Wal-Mart should have anticipated that claim from deposition testimony.
- The district court, after addressing summary judgment, issued a sua sponte order to show cause why Agola should not be sanctioned under Rule 11 for misrepresenting that gender discrimination was clearly pled.
- The district court found Agola’s position frivolous, emphasized what “any competent attorney” would have done, discussed her prior disciplinary history and alleged incompetence in other matters, and imposed a $7,500 monetary sanction.
- Agola appealed the sanctions order to the Second Circuit.

## Issues

1. Whether the district court applied Rule 11’s objective-reasonableness standard when sanctioning counsel for asserting that a gender-discrimination claim was “clearly pled.”
2. Whether a Rule 11 analysis may rest primarily on counsel’s perceived competence and prior disciplinary history rather than on the objective reasonableness of the challenged filing when signed.
3. Whether it was objectively unreasonable for counsel to argue that a pro se complaint, liberally construed and viewed with discovery-developed facts, encompassed a gender-discrimination claim.

## Decision

- The Second Circuit vacated the $7,500 sanctions order and reversed the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions.
- The court held the district court misapplied Rule 11 by using a generalized “competent attorney” framing and by placing substantial weight on counsel’s disciplinary history and perceived overall performance.
- The court concluded that, even if counsel’s characterization of the pleading was overstated, the argument was not so baseless that no reasonable attorney could make it in light of liberal construction for pro se pleadings and the case context.

## Legal Principles

- Rule 11 employs an objective-reasonableness standard: the question is whether, after reasonable inquiry, a competent attorney could believe a specific contention is warranted in fact and law at the time it is made.
- The Rule 11 inquiry is paper-specific; it is not a mechanism to punish perceived incompetence or to “grade” counsel’s performance in other matters.
- Prior disciplinary history may inform deterrence or the severity of a sanction only after a Rule 11 violation is properly found; it cannot substitute for the required finding that the challenged filing was objectively unreasonable.
- Advocacy grounded in a colorable legal position—such as arguments relying on liberal construction of pro se pleadings and facts developed in discovery—should not be sanctioned merely because the court rejects it on the merits.

## Conclusion

The Second Circuit set aside Rule 11 sanctions because the district court failed to tether its analysis to the objective reasonableness of the specific challenged assertion and instead relied heavily on counsel’s perceived general competence and disciplinary history, while the disputed argument remained within the range of nonfrivolous advocacy in context.


Muhammad v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 732 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2013)