## Facts

- William Murphy worked for A.A. Busch & Co. of Massachusetts, Inc. and suffered a myocardial infarction in August 1991.
- He filed a workers’ compensation claim alleging his heart condition arose out of employment.
- William Murphy died of a heart attack on March 19, 1992, while the claim was pending.
- Jean Murphy, his widow, sought to amend the claim to add herself and pursue survivor benefits under G.L. c. 152, § 31.
- After an adverse conference order under G.L. c. 152, § 10A (July 17, 1992), Murphy sought to appeal for a full evidentiary hearing involving disputed medical issues.
- Under G.L. c. 152, § 11A (as amended in 1991), a claimant represented by counsel appealing a conference order involving medical issues had to pay a fee equal to the Commonwealth’s average weekly wage to fund an impartial medical examination; pro se claimants were exempt.
- Murphy wished to proceed with counsel but asserted she could not afford the § 11A fee and challenged the fee’s constitutionality.

## Issues

1. Whether G.L. c. 152, § 11A violates equal protection by requiring a substantial medical-exam fee from claimants represented by counsel, while exempting pro se claimants.
2. Whether the same fee scheme violates Massachusetts Declaration of Rights art. 11 by conditioning access to adjudication on payment by only one class of claimants.

## Decision

- The Supreme Judicial Court held the challenged fee provisions unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment and Massachusetts Declaration of Rights art. 11.
- The court applied rational-basis review and concluded the distinction between represented and unrepresented claimants lacked a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose.
- The court declared invalid the portions of § 11A that imposed a fee only on claimants represented by counsel (and set the fee at the Commonwealth’s average weekly wage).
- The case was remanded for entry of judgment consistent with the ruling.

## Legal Principles

- When a statutory classification does not involve a suspect class or fundamental right, equal protection is evaluated under rational-basis review; the classification must be rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest.
- A fee aimed at defraying the cost of an adjudicatory requirement must not arbitrarily single out one subset of similarly situated litigants without a rational justification.
- Massachusetts Declaration of Rights art. 11 protects access to the courts and related adjudicatory processes by securing a remedy “freely” and “without being obliged to purchase it”; selective financial barriers that effectively deter meaningful access may violate art. 11.

## Conclusion

The court invalidated a workers’ compensation medical-examination fee imposed only on claimants represented by counsel because the classification was irrational in relation to cost-defraying goals and improperly burdened access to the administrative adjudication process under both equal protection and art. 11.


Murphy v. Comm'r of the Dep't of Indus. Accidents, 415 Mass. 218, 612 N.E.2d 1149 (1993)