## Facts

- Congress enacted the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992 (PASPA), which barred states from “sponsor[ing], operat[ing], advertis[ing], promot[ing], licens[ing], or authoriz[ing]” sports-gambling schemes, while grandfathering certain state regimes and providing New Jersey a time-limited opportunity to legalize sports betting.
- New Jersey later amended its constitution to allow the legislature to permit sports wagering at casinos and racetracks.
- New Jersey enacted legislation that authorized sports wagering at specified venues and, later, partially repealed state prohibitions on sports betting under specified conditions.
- The NCAA and several professional sports leagues sued New Jersey officials, alleging the state measures violated PASPA.
- The federal district court enjoined New Jersey’s 2014 law as preempted by PASPA, and the Third Circuit affirmed, including on rehearing en banc.
- The Supreme Court granted review to decide whether PASPA’s prohibition on state “authorization” violates the Tenth Amendment’s anti-commandeering rule and, if so, whether the rest of PASPA could remain in force.

## Issues

1. Whether PASPA’s ban on state “authorization” of sports gambling impermissibly commandeers state legislative authority in violation of the Tenth Amendment.
2. Whether PASPA’s remaining provisions are severable if the anti-authorization provision is unconstitutional.

## Decision

- The Court held (7–2) that PASPA’s provision prohibiting state “authorization” of sports gambling violates the Tenth Amendment’s anti-commandeering doctrine.
- The Court concluded that a state’s repeal of its own sports-betting prohibitions constitutes “authorization” under PASPA, so PASPA functioned as a direct command restricting state lawmaking.
- The Court rejected the argument that the anti-authorization rule was valid federal preemption, reasoning it did not regulate private conduct but instead dictated what state legislatures may and may not do.
- The Court held (6–3) that PASPA’s remaining provisions were not severable from the unconstitutional provisions, and therefore PASPA was invalid in its entirety.
- The Court stated that Congress may regulate sports betting directly but may not do so by ordering states to maintain or enact prohibitions.

## Legal Principles

- Under the anti-commandeering doctrine, Congress may not directly control a state legislature’s lawmaking choices, including by prohibiting a state from repealing or modifying its own laws.
- A federal statute is not valid preemption when it does not regulate private actors and instead issues commands to state governments about what state law must (or must not) provide.
- When an unconstitutional provision is central to a statutory scheme, the Court may invalidate the statute as a whole if the remaining provisions cannot function as Congress intended.

## Conclusion

The Court held that PASPA’s restriction on state “authorization” of sports betting unconstitutionally commandeered state legislatures and, because the statute’s remaining provisions were not severable, struck down PASPA in full, leaving sports-betting policy primarily to state law unless Congress regulates it directly.


Murphy v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 584 U.S. 453 (2018)