## Facts

- John Murray was arrested in Belfast on January 7, 1990 under terrorism-related legislation and suspected of involvement in offenses connected to the detention of an alleged police informer.
- Upon arrest, police administered a caution warning that a court could draw inferences if he later relied on facts he failed to mention when questioned.
- Over roughly 21 hours of interviews across two days, Murray refused to answer police questions.
- Murray requested legal assistance, but access to a solicitor was delayed for 48 hours under statutory powers allowing delay in certain terrorism investigations.
- Murray was tried in a non-jury “Diplock” court; he did not testify and called no witnesses.
- Domestic law permitted adverse inferences from (a) silence during police questioning and (b) refusal to testify at trial; the trial judge drew inferences and convicted Murray of aiding and abetting unlawful imprisonment, sentencing him to eight years.
- The Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland dismissed Murray’s appeal.

## Issues

1. Whether permitting and drawing adverse inferences from Murray’s silence during police questioning and at trial violated the right to a fair trial and the presumption of innocence under Article 6(1) and 6(2) of the European Convention on Human Rights.
2. Whether delaying access to a solicitor for 48 hours during custodial questioning violated Article 6(3)(c) read with Article 6(1).
3. Whether differential criminal procedure rules applied in Northern Ireland, compared with other parts of the United Kingdom, amounted to discrimination contrary to Article 14 taken with Article 6.

## Decision

- The court held there was no violation of Article 6(1) or Article 6(2) from allowing adverse inferences to be drawn from silence, where the overall proceedings remained fair and the conviction was not based solely or mainly on silence.
- The court found a violation of Article 6(1) taken together with Article 6(3)(c) because the 48-hour denial of access to legal advice, in a system where silence could carry evidential consequences, rendered the proceedings unfair.
- The court found no separate violation of Article 14 in conjunction with Article 6.

## Legal Principles

- The right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimination are important components of a fair trial under Article 6, but they are not absolute.
- Adverse inferences from an accused’s silence are not inherently incompatible with Article 6, provided safeguards exist and the prosecution still proves guilt without shifting the burden of proof to the accused.
- The fairness assessment depends on context, including the caution given, the weight placed on silence, and whether there is independent evidence supporting guilt.
- Early access to a lawyer is a core defense safeguard; restrictions may be allowed for good cause, but they must not unduly prejudice the defense, especially where decisions during interrogation can later be used against the accused.
- Where legal rules allow silence to be used adversely, denial of timely legal advice during custodial questioning can compromise the fairness of the proceedings.

## Conclusion

The court upheld the compatibility of carefully limited adverse inferences from silence with Article 6, but held that delaying access to counsel during interrogation—when silence carried potential adverse consequences—breached the right to a fair trial.


Murray v. United Kingdom, 22 Eur. Ct. H.R. 29 (1996)