## Facts

- Samuel Swartwout, a federal customs collector, was found administratively to owe a substantial balance to the United States after an audit.
- Under the Act of May 15, 1820, the Solicitor of the Treasury could issue a “distress warrant” to collect balances due from public accountants without first obtaining a judicial judgment.
- The Solicitor issued a distress warrant against Swartwout; a federal marshal levied on Swartwout’s New Jersey land and sold it.
- Hoboken Land & Improvement Co. claimed title through the federal sale.
- Murray’s successors claimed title through Swartwout and brought ejectment actions to recover possession, arguing the seizure and sale were unconstitutional.
- In the federal circuit court, the judges divided on questions including the constitutionality of the distress-warrant procedure and the validity of the resulting sale; the case reached the Supreme Court on a certificate of division.

## Issues

1. Whether authorizing executive officers to issue and execute a distress warrant to collect a public debt is an unconstitutional exercise of Article III “judicial power.”
2. Whether summary levy and sale under a distress warrant, based on an administratively determined balance due, deprives a person of property without due process of law in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
3. What evidentiary effect the distress warrant and the marshal’s return have in establishing the regularity of the levy and the validity of title derived from the sale.

## Decision

- The Court upheld the constitutionality of the Act of May 15, 1820 and the distress-warrant procedure.
- It ruled the issuance and execution of the distress warrant were exercises of executive power, not Article III judicial power.
- It held the procedure did not violate the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
- It treated the warrant as sufficient authority to justify the marshal’s levy, and the marshal’s return as at least prima facie evidence that the levy was regular.
- By sustaining the validity of the levy and sale, the Court sustained Hoboken’s title; it did not reach other certified questions deemed unnecessary.

## Legal Principles

- Congress may authorize summary executive procedures to collect debts owed to the United States as part of its revenue-collection powers, without converting the process into an exercise of Article III judicial power.
- “Due process of law” does not require a pre-deprivation judicial trial in every instance; its content is informed by historically accepted legal processes, including longstanding summary methods for collecting public debts.
- Due process may be satisfied where a statute provides an avenue for later judicial determination of the alleged indebtedness, even if property is first levied upon as security.
- The Fourth Amendment’s oath-or-affirmation requirements for warrants do not govern a distress warrant used to collect a debt rather than to conduct a search.
- A distress warrant can conclusively establish authority for the marshal to levy as against the marshal’s justification, while leaving the underlying indebtedness open to judicial contest; the marshal’s return may serve as prima facie proof of regularity.

## Conclusion

The Court sustained a federal title derived from a Treasury distress-warrant sale, holding that congressionally authorized, historically grounded executive collection procedures for public debts can proceed without a prior judicial judgment and still satisfy Fifth Amendment due process where judicial review of liability remains available.


Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856)