## Facts

- Lucy Mydlach bought a used 1996 Dodge Neon from an independent dealer in June 1998 with 26,296 miles.
- The vehicle remained within the manufacturer’s three-year/36,000-mile “Basic Warranty,” measured from the earlier of initial delivery or first service date (June 24, 1996).
- The warranty promised no-charge parts and labor to repair defects in materials, workmanship, or factory preparation during the warranty period.
- Soon after purchase, Mydlach repeatedly sought warranty repairs from authorized dealers for multiple problems, including a recurring fluid leak, and alleged the repair attempts did not correct the defects and impaired use.
- In May 2001, she sued DaimlerChrysler under the Magnuson–Moss Warranty Act for breach of written warranty, breach of implied warranty of merchantability, and revocation of acceptance, seeking damages and equitable relief including a repurchase remedy.

## Issues

1. Whether breach-of-warranty claims based on a manufacturer’s “repair or replace” obligation accrue at the vehicle’s original tender of delivery (1996) under UCC § 2-725, making the 2001 action time-barred.
2. Whether revocation of acceptance may be asserted against a nonselling manufacturer that did not transfer title to the buyer.

## Decision

- The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the appellate court and remanded.
- It held that, for a written warranty functioning as a promise to repair defects during a stated period, breach (and accrual) occurs when the manufacturer fails to repair after a reasonable opportunity, not at tender of delivery.
- It concluded Mydlach’s Magnuson–Moss written-warranty claim premised on failure to repair was not time-barred under the UCC’s four-year limitations period.
- It held revocation of acceptance is not available against DaimlerChrysler because it was not the seller in the transaction; that remedy is directed to unwinding the buyer–seller sale.
- It dismissed the revocation-of-acceptance theory against DaimlerChrysler while allowing the timely repair-warranty-based claim to proceed.

## Legal Principles

- Magnuson–Moss warranty claims generally incorporate state-law warranty and remedial rules, including limitations and accrual concepts.
- For a warranty whose operative undertaking is to repair defects during a specified period, the UCC § 2-725 “tender of delivery” accrual rule does not control; accrual occurs upon failure to repair after a reasonable opportunity.
- UCC revocation of acceptance is a buyer–seller remedy tied to rescinding the sale and recovering the price; it is unavailable against a manufacturer that did not sell the goods or pass title to the buyer.
- Magnuson–Moss does not expand state-law revocation remedies to allow revocation against nonselling manufacturers merely because they are “warrantors.”

## Conclusion

The court treated a limited “repair or replace” warranty as breached when the warrantor fails to repair after a reasonable opportunity, making the buyer’s Magnuson–Moss repair-warranty claim timely, but it barred revocation-of-acceptance relief against a nonselling manufacturer and remanded for further proceedings on the remaining warranty claim.


Mydlach v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 226 Ill. 2d 307, 875 N.E.2d 1047 (Ill. 2007)