Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938)

Facts

  • The National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) received a union charge alleging Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp. committed unfair labor practices at its Quincy, Massachusetts plant.
  • The NLRB issued an unfair-labor-practice complaint alleging, among other things, Bethlehem dominated and interfered with a labor organization (a company “Plan of Representation”) and that related labor disputes burdened commerce.
  • The NLRB noticed a hearing on the complaint.
  • Bethlehem sued in federal district court to enjoin the NLRB hearing, alleging it was not engaged in interstate or foreign commerce and that the hearing would cause irreparable injury (expense, disruption, harm to goodwill and labor relations).
  • In a separate suit, employee officers of the representation plan sought to enjoin the hearing, alleging the proceeding would discredit and undermine their chosen representation plan and cause employment and operational harms.
  • The district court granted preliminary injunctions; the court of appeals affirmed.

Issues

  1. Whether a federal district court has equity jurisdiction to enjoin the NLRB from holding an unfair-labor-practice hearing based on alleged noncoverage under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) and claimed irreparable injury from the hearing itself.
  2. Whether the NLRA’s administrative process and designated judicial-review mechanism in the courts of appeals is exclusive, requiring parties to present objections in the agency proceeding and seek later appellate review.

Decision

  • The Supreme Court reversed and directed dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
  • The district court lacked jurisdiction to enjoin the NLRB from holding the hearing in both the employer’s suit and the employees’ suit.
  • Claims that the employer was not engaged in interstate or foreign commerce, and that the hearing would cause irreparable injury, did not justify pre-hearing injunctive relief in district court.
  • Channeling review to the NLRA process and subsequent review in the court of appeals did not violate constitutional rights.
  • When Congress provides a specific, adequate administrative process and a designated path for judicial review, that scheme is ordinarily exclusive and cannot be bypassed through district-court equity suits to halt agency proceedings.
  • Parties generally must exhaust administrative remedies, including presenting jurisdictional and statutory-coverage objections to the agency in the first instance, and then seek judicial review through the statute’s review provisions.
  • Expense, inconvenience, and disruption associated with participating in an administrative hearing are not sufficient “irreparable injury” to justify district-court interference where the statute provides later judicial review.

Conclusion

The Court held that federal district courts may not enjoin NLRB unfair-labor-practice hearings on claims of noncoverage or litigation burdens because the NLRA commits initial adjudication to the Board and channels judicial review exclusively to the courts of appeals after Board action.