## Facts

- Congress enacted the Northern Cheyenne Allotment Act of 1926, which allotted surface lands but reserved “coal and other mineral deposits” for the Tribe while stating that, 50 years after the Act, the deposits “shall become the property of the respective allottees or their heirs.”
- The 1926 Act also provided that “unallotted lands” would remain subject to congressional “control and management” as Congress deemed beneficial for the Indians.
- In 1968, Congress amended the 1926 Act to reserve mineral rights “in perpetuity for the benefit of the Tribe,” contingent on a prior judicial determination that the 1926 Act had not granted allottees vested mineral rights.
- The Tribe sought a declaration that allottees and their successors held only an expectancy in the mineral deposits, not vested property rights.
- The federal district court held the 1926 Act did not vest mineral rights in allottees, construing “unallotted lands” to include the mineral estate and thus remain subject to congressional control.
- The Ninth Circuit reversed, characterizing § 3 as an unconditional, noncontingent grant of minerals to allottees in the absence of an express reservation of congressional power over the deposits.
- The Supreme Court granted review.

## Issues

1. Whether § 3 of the Northern Cheyenne Allotment Act of 1926 granted allottees vested property rights in the mineral deposits underlying their surface allotments.
2. If the 1926 Act did not vest mineral rights, whether Congress could validly amend the statute in 1968 to reserve those mineral rights in perpetuity for the Tribe.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit in a unanimous judgment.
- The Court held that the 1926 Act did not give allottees vested rights in the underlying mineral deposits.
- Because the allottees had only an expectancy, Congress could amend the statute in 1968 to reserve mineral rights indefinitely for the Tribe, subject to the amendment’s judicial-determination condition.
- Justice Blackmun concurred in the result.

## Legal Principles

- Statutory language contemplating a future transfer of property interests may create only an expectancy, not a vested right, when the statute’s structure and purpose show Congress did not intend an irrevocable grant.
- In interpreting statutes affecting Indian property interests, courts may rely on statutory text read as a whole, legislative history, and consistent administrative construction.
- A “control and management” clause reserving congressional authority for the benefit of the Indians supports construing ambiguous provisions to preserve congressional power over reserved interests, including mineral estates separated from allotted surface estates.
- Absent vested rights, Congress may alter or terminate expectancies created by prior legislation before the contemplated future transfer occurs.

## Conclusion

The Court concluded that § 3 of the 1926 Act did not vest mineral ownership in Northern Cheyenne allottees, so Congress retained authority to change the disposition of the mineral estate and could, in 1968, reserve the minerals in perpetuity for the Tribe.


N. Cheyenne Tribe v. Hollowbreast, 425 U.S. 649 (1976)