## Facts

- California voters enacted Proposition 12, which bars the in-state sale of certain pork products if they come from breeding pigs (or their immediate offspring) confined in a way California defines as “cruel,” including conditions that prevent the animal from lying down, standing up, fully extending its limbs, or turning around freely.
- California enacted the measure based on animal-welfare concerns and the idea that consumers may wish to avoid products tied to housing practices they view as inhumane.
- California imports most, though not all, of its pork from out-of-state producers; California’s pork market is large compared to many individual state markets.
- National Pork Producers Council and the American Farm Bureau Federation (collectively, the council) sued California officials responsible for enforcement, claiming Proposition 12 violates the dormant Commerce Clause by burdening interstate commerce.
- The council conceded the law was not enacted to economically discriminate against out-of-state producers or to shield in-state producers; the requirements applied equally to any producer selling pork into California.
- The council alleged that the law would nonetheless impose disproportionate economic effects on out-of-state businesses because many hogs are raised outside California and integrated supply chains would face increased costs, including barn modifications and operational changes; the council noted that a significant portion of the industry had already moved to compliant group housing, but argued broader compliance would still be costly and disruptive.
- The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
- The Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s judgment, issuing multiple opinions; at least five Justices agreed the case was properly dismissed at the pleading stage.

## Issues

1. Does the dormant Commerce Clause contain an “extraterritoriality” rule that invalidates a state sales restriction merely because it has substantial practical effects on out-of-state producers and may influence out-of-state production choices?
2. Under Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., can a nondiscriminatory state sales standard be struck down at the motion-to-dismiss stage based on alleged nationwide compliance costs and alleged limited in-state benefits?
3. Where plaintiffs concede there is no purposeful economic discrimination, do allegations of disproportionate out-of-state economic effects state a dormant Commerce Clause claim?

## Decision

- The Court affirmed the Ninth Circuit’s judgment dismissing the complaint.
- The Court rejected an “almost per se” dormant Commerce Clause theory based on extraterritorial effects where the law regulates only in-state sales and does not directly control out-of-state transactions.
- The Court held the complaint did not plausibly plead that Proposition 12 imposes burdens on interstate commerce that are “clearly excessive” relative to California’s asserted interests under Pike, particularly on the pleadings and given the nature of the local interests asserted.
- Several opinions addressed the difficulty of weighing asserted moral or animal-welfare interests against economic costs; some Justices would have allowed further factual development on the Pike theory, but a majority to affirm concluded dismissal was proper.

## Legal Principles

- The dormant Commerce Clause is primarily an anti-discrimination doctrine: it targets state laws that purposefully favor in-state economic interests over out-of-state competitors.
- A state law is not unconstitutional simply because it changes incentives for out-of-state firms or has significant upstream economic effects outside the state; market effects alone do not equal direct regulation of out-of-state commerce.
- Prior “extraterritoriality” cases are best understood as involving state laws that directly regulated out-of-state prices or tied in-state prices to out-of-state transactions; those precedents do not create a general ban on state product standards for goods sold in-state.
- Under Pike, a nondiscriminatory law may be invalid if its burdens on interstate commerce are clearly excessive compared with the law’s putative local benefits, but courts may be reluctant to do that work on a bare complaint where asserted benefits include moral or animal-welfare interests and the alleged burdens are not pleaded in a way that makes excessiveness clear as a matter of law.
- When nationwide uniformity is sought for supply-chain rules affecting interstate markets, Congress—rather than judicial invalidation under an expansive dormant Commerce Clause theory—is the institution with authority to adopt national rules.

## Conclusion

National Pork Producers Council v. Ross held that California’s Proposition 12 condition on the in-state sale of certain pork products did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause on the pleadings: the Court declined to treat the law’s out-of-state economic effects as a per se constitutional problem, emphasized the dormant Commerce Clause’s focus on economic discrimination, and concluded the complaint did not plausibly state an undue-burden claim under Pike.


National Pork Producers Council v. Ross, 598 U.S. 356 (2023)