Facts
- The matrimonial home was owned by Mr. Ainsworth, who had mortgaged the property to the National Provincial Bank.
- Mrs. Ainsworth, his wife, claimed a right to occupy the home based on her contributions to the household and her status as a spouse.
- After Mr. Ainsworth defaulted on the mortgage, the bank sought possession of the property.
- Mrs. Ainsworth argued that her right of occupation was binding on the bank as a third-party mortgagee.
Issues
- Whether Mrs. Ainsworth's right to occupy the matrimonial home amounted to a proprietary interest capable of binding third parties, such as a mortgagee.
- Whether a personal licence based on family relationships could constitute a proprietary right in land.
- Whether equitable or informal arrangements arising from family situations can result in rights enforceable against third-party purchasers or mortgagees.
Decision
- The House of Lords held that Mrs. Ainsworth's right to occupy the home was a personal licence rather than a proprietary interest.
- The court determined that personal rights, including licences, do not bind third parties such as the bank.
- The judgment clarified that only proprietary interests meeting specific criteria (certainty, definability, capacity to bind land) are enforceable against third parties.
- The court rejected the argument that equitable principles or informal family arrangements could convert a personal right into a proprietary interest.
Legal Principles
- Licences are personal rights granting permission to use land but do not constitute proprietary interests in land.
- For a right to bind successors in title, it must be a property right characterized by certainty, definability, and the capacity to attach to the land.
- Informal or family-based rights to occupy property do not automatically translate into enforceable interests against third parties.
- Equitable principles cannot transform personal licences into proprietary interests, though they may provide personal remedies such as estoppel.
Conclusion
The House of Lords confirmed that a spouse's right to occupy a matrimonial home, arising from a personal licence, is not a proprietary interest capable of binding third parties, thereby protecting the integrity and certainty of property transactions against informal or equitable claims arising from family relationships.