## Facts

- New York’s Department of Financial Services (DFS) regulates banks and insurance companies; Maria T. Vullo served as DFS Superintendent during the relevant period.
- DFS investigated NRA-endorsed “affinity” insurance programs, including “Carry Guard,” for alleged violations of New York insurance law.
- After a widely publicized school shooting in February 2018, the NRA alleged that New York officials sought to weaken the NRA by pressuring regulated entities to end business relationships with it.
- In April 2018, Vullo issued two “guidance letters” to all insurers and financial institutions doing business in New York about “risk management” concerning the NRA and similar organizations.
- The letters urged regulated entities to reassess relationships with the NRA, highlighted “reputational risks,” praised companies that had cut ties, and encouraged others to do likewise.
- A public statement released the same day urged regulated entities to “sever ties” with the NRA and other gun-promotion groups.
- The NRA alleged that, in a meeting with a major insurer, Vullo tied DFS enforcement decisions to whether the insurer would stop doing business with the NRA and other gun groups.
- Following these events, certain insurers and brokers ended NRA-related relationships and entered consent orders that, as alleged, included commitments not to participate in NRA affinity insurance programs even if compliant with state law.
- The NRA alleged these actions constituted a coordinated campaign to coerce third parties to “blacklist” the NRA to punish or suppress its pro-gun advocacy.

## Issues

1. Whether a state financial regulator violates the First Amendment by using regulatory authority to coerce regulated entities to terminate business relationships with a disfavored advocacy organization.
2. Whether the NRA’s complaint plausibly alleged unconstitutional coercion (as opposed to permissible government speech or lawful enforcement) sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.
3. Whether clearly established law barred dismissal on qualified-immunity grounds at the pleading stage.

## Decision

- The Supreme Court unanimously vacated the Second Circuit’s judgment and remanded.
- The Court held the NRA plausibly alleged a First Amendment violation: coercion of regulated entities to sever ties with the NRA to punish or suppress its advocacy.
- The Court emphasized the procedural posture: at the motion-to-dismiss stage, the allegations were assumed true and tested only for plausibility.
- The Court rejected the view that the challenged conduct was categorically protected as government speech or routine law enforcement, given allegations of threats and conditional regulatory treatment.
- The Court concluded that existing precedent clearly prohibited “informal censorship” through threats of adverse regulatory action, defeating qualified-immunity dismissal at this stage.

## Legal Principles

- Government may speak and attempt to persuade, but it may not use threats of adverse regulatory action, or promises of regulatory leniency, to pressure private parties to suppress or punish protected speech.
- Coercion can be plausibly alleged when a regulator with enforcement power urges private actors to cut ties with a speaker in a manner that a reasonable recipient would understand as backed by potential regulatory consequences.
- Viewpoint-based retaliation through regulatory leverage—targeting an organization because of its advocacy—states a First Amendment claim when plausibly pleaded.
- Longstanding precedent forbids “informal censorship” tactics that achieve suppression without formal legal process; such law can be clearly established for qualified-immunity purposes.

## Conclusion

The Court held that allegations that a state regulator used regulatory power and implied threats to pressure insurers and financial institutions to stop doing business with an advocacy organization because of its viewpoint were sufficient to state a First Amendment claim, requiring further proceedings on the merits.


Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am. v. Vullo, 144 S. Ct. 1413 (2024)