## Facts

- Eagle County Sheriff’s Lieutenant Randy Parker stopped a large dark vehicle on I‑70 after another officer radioed that radar showed the car was speeding.
- John Navratil was driving; his father, Boris Navratil (plaintiff), was a passenger, along with John’s fiancée.
- As Parker followed the car at night, he shined a spotlight toward it and saw an object passed from the front to the back seat; John later said it was a radar detector.
- After the stop, both John and Boris exited the car. Parker repeatedly ordered Boris to get back inside; Boris repeatedly asked why they had been stopped and complained Parker was rude. Boris eventually returned to the car.
- Parker took John’s driver’s license and went back to his patrol car. Several minutes later, Parker returned to the stopped car.
- Boris exited again and walked toward Parker and John to give John a coat. Boris admitted he was agitated and waved his arms as he spoke.
- Other officers arrived. Parker’s police dog came out of the patrol car and stood near Parker while restrained. John testified the dog did not growl, snarl, or bare its teeth, though he also said “no one would argue with the dog.”
- Boris again returned to the vehicle after John urged him to do so and Parker again directed him to get back in the car.
- Boris then exited a third time, about 10–15 minutes into the stop. Parker told him to get back in the car or he would be arrested. Boris responded that if Parker was going to arrest him, he should do it so they could be on their way.
- Parker handcuffed and arrested Boris and took him to jail. Boris was charged (and later convicted) of obstructing a peace officer; the conviction was later reversed.
- Boris sued Parker asserting federal civil-rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (challenging the stop, detention, and arrest and alleging excessive force) and state-law tort claims for assault, battery, invasion of privacy, false arrest/false imprisonment, and outrageous conduct.
- Parker moved for summary judgment, arguing qualified immunity on the federal claims and statutory immunity under Colorado law on the state claims.

## Issues

1. Whether Parker was entitled to qualified immunity because his conduct during the traffic stop, detention, and arrest did not violate clearly established Fourth Amendment rights.
2. Whether Parker had at least arguable probable cause to arrest Boris for obstructing or disobeying a peace officer based on Boris’s repeated refusal to follow directions during the stop.
3. Whether shining a spotlight into the vehicle, and related officer-safety measures at the scene (including the restrained presence of a police dog), could support Fourth Amendment liability or an excessive-force claim on this record.
4. Whether Colorado governmental-employee immunity barred Boris’s state tort claims absent evidence that Parker acted willfully and wantonly.

## Decision

- The court granted summary judgment for Parker on all claims.
- Parker was entitled to qualified immunity on the § 1983 claims because, viewing the record in the light most favorable to Boris, Parker’s actions did not amount to a violation of clearly established federal rights.
- The stop was objectively reasonable because Parker relied on a contemporaneous radar report relayed by another officer indicating the car was speeding.
- Using a spotlight to illuminate the interior from a lawful position was not treated as an unconstitutional search, and it did not show a clearly established constitutional violation.
- The evidence regarding the police dog did not show an unlawful use of force or a tortious attack: the dog was restrained and did not make contact, and there was no evidence of biting or physical injury.
- Given Boris’s repeated exits from the car, agitated approach, and refusal to comply with repeated directions during a lawful stop, Parker had at least arguable probable cause to arrest Boris for obstruction/disobedience; the later reversal of the criminal conviction did not establish a constitutional violation at the time of arrest.
- The excessive-force theory failed because the record showed only routine handcuffing and arrest handling, without evidence of gratuitous violence or injury.
- Colorado statutory immunity barred the state-law tort claims because Parker was acting within the scope of his duties and the record did not support a finding of willful and wanton conduct.

## Legal Principles

- An officer may rely on another officer’s contemporaneous radio report of a traffic violation to justify a stop; the constitutional question focuses on objective reasonableness at the time of the stop.
- Illumination of a vehicle’s interior with a spotlight or similar light from a lawful vantage point is generally not, by itself, a Fourth Amendment search.
- In assessing qualified immunity, courts ask whether the officer’s conduct violated clearly established law; the later dismissal or reversal of criminal charges does not, by itself, eliminate probable cause that existed at the time of arrest.
- Routine handcuffing and standard arrest procedures ordinarily do not constitute excessive force absent evidence of unnecessary force or resulting injury.
- Under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act, public employees are generally immune from tort liability for acts within the scope of employment unless the plaintiff shows the employee acted willfully and wantonly.
- Assault, battery, and related tort claims based on a police dog require evidence of threatening or harmful contact attributable to the officer; the restrained presence of a dog, without contact, is generally insufficient.

## Conclusion

The court entered summary judgment for Deputy Parker, holding that the traffic stop and ensuing orders to remain in the vehicle were objectively reasonable safety measures, that Parker had at least arguable probable cause to arrest Boris Navratil after repeated noncompliance during the stop, and that the limited force used (handcuffing) and the restrained dog’s presence did not support constitutional or tort liability; qualified immunity and Colorado statutory immunity therefore barred the federal and state claims.


Navratil v. Parker, 726 F. Supp. 800 (1989)