Negligence - Legal or proximate cause

Learning Outcomes

This article explains legal or proximate cause in negligence, including:

• How legal (proximate) cause fits into the overall negligence analysis and where it appears in typical MBE question structures.
• The distinction between actual cause (cause in fact) and legal (proximate) cause, and how examiners test that difference using tricky answer choices.
• How courts use foreseeability and the “scope of the risk” to limit liability, especially in modern formulations of the proximate-cause test.
• How to analyze direct and indirect cause fact patterns, and to translate narrative facts into “type of harm” and “chain of events” issues.
• How intervening causes operate, when they become superseding causes, and how to classify common intervening-force patterns on the exam.
• The effect of third-party negligence, intentional torts, crimes, and “acts of God” on proximate cause, including when such acts cut off liability.
• The “eggshell plaintiff” rule and its relationship to foreseeability, damages, and the extent-versus-type-of-harm distinction.
• Common MBE traps involving causation, such as confusing actual and proximate cause or mislabeling intervening causes, and strategies to avoid them.
• How proximate cause interacts with multiple tortfeasors, joint and several liability, successive or concurrent negligence, and indivisible harm.

MBE Syllabus

For the MBE, you are required to understand how courts determine the scope of liability in negligence actions, with a focus on the following syllabus points:

• The distinction between actual cause and legal (proximate) cause.
• The foreseeability test for proximate cause and the modern “scope of the risk” approach.
• The effect of intervening and superseding causes on liability.
• The “eggshell plaintiff” rule regarding the extent of damages.
• The difference between direct and indirect cause cases.
• The role of foreseeability in limiting liability for unusual or remote consequences.
• Interaction of proximate cause with joint and several liability where multiple tortfeasors are involved.

Test Your Knowledge

Attempt these questions before reading this article. If you find some difficult or cannot remember the answers, remember to look more closely at that area during your revision.

1. In a negligence case, what is the primary function of the doctrine of proximate cause?
   1. To determine if the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiff.
   2. To limit liability to harms that are foreseeable results of the defendant's conduct.
   3. To establish whether the defendant's act was a factual cause of the harm.
   4. To require proof of intent to harm.
2. Which of the following is most likely a superseding cause that will relieve a defendant of liability?
   1. Ordinary negligence by a rescuer.
   2. A foreseeable medical complication.
   3. An unforeseeable criminal act by a third party.
   4. A subsequent accident caused by the plaintiff's weakened condition.
3. Under the "eggshell plaintiff" rule, a defendant is:
   1. Only liable for the harm that was foreseeable.
   2. Liable for the full extent of the plaintiff's injuries, even if unusually severe.
   3. Not liable if the plaintiff had a pre-existing condition.
   4. Liable only if the plaintiff's injuries were minor.

Introduction

In negligence, a defendant is not automatically liable for every harm that follows from their breach of duty. The law requires two distinct causal links:

• Actual (factual) cause – Did the breach actually contribute to the injury in a “but for” or substantial-factor sense?
• Legal (proximate) cause – Is it fair to hold this defendant legally responsible for this particular injury?

Proximate cause is a policy-based limitation on liability. It recognizes that, although practically everything has countless effects, the law will only attach liability to harms that fall within a reasonable, foreseeable scope of risk created by the defendant’s negligence.

Key Term: Proximate Cause
The legal limitation on negligence liability, restricting recovery to harms that are a foreseeable result of the defendant's conduct and within the scope of risks that made the conduct negligent.

Proximate cause is distinct from actual cause. A defendant’s conduct can easily be an actual cause of a harm (because the harm would not have occurred “but for” that conduct) yet still be too remote or unusual to count as a proximate cause.

Key Term: Foreseeability
The standard used to determine whether the type of harm, or the general manner in which it occurred, was a reasonably predictable result of the defendant's conduct.

Modern courts often describe proximate cause in terms of the scope of the risk created by the defendant’s negligence.

Key Term: Scope of the Risk
The set of harms whose likelihood made the defendant’s conduct negligent in the first place; proximate cause is usually limited to harms falling within this set.

Two related ideas run through all proximate cause questions:

• Type of harm – Was the general kind of harm that occurred one of the risks that made the defendant’s conduct negligent in the first place?
• Chain of events – Did any later event (an intervening cause) break the chain in a way that makes it unfair to keep holding the original defendant liable?

On the MBE, once you have found duty, breach, and actual cause, proximate cause is where many answers are decided. The key is to think in terms of reasonable foreseeability and scope of risk, not perfect prediction of the exact sequence of events.

Proximate Cause vs. Duty: Who Is Protected

Sometimes foreseeability is discussed under duty (foreseeable plaintiffs within the “zone of danger”) and sometimes under proximate cause (foreseeable harms within the scope of risk). On the MBE, you do not need to label the step as duty or proximate cause so long as you:

• Identify whether the plaintiff was a foreseeable person to be harmed by the defendant’s conduct, and
• Identify whether the type of harm suffered was a foreseeable risk of that conduct.

Many answer choices will phrase this as “the defendant had no duty to protect against this risk” or “the harm was not within the scope of the risk.” Both are acceptable ways to express a proximate-cause limitation.

The Role of Proximate Cause

Proximate cause is the second step in causation analysis. Even if the defendant's breach was an actual cause of the plaintiff's injury, the court must decide whether the injury is close enough in time and relation to the breach to justify liability.

In most jurisdictions (and on the MBE), courts apply a foreseeability / scope-of-the-risk test:

• Ask: What risks made this conduct negligent?
• Then ask: Did the plaintiff suffer one of those risks?

If the answer is yes, proximate cause is usually satisfied, even if the details of how the harm occurred are unusual.

If the answer is no—if the harm is of a type that does not fall within the original scope of risk—the defendant is not liable, even though their conduct may be an actual cause.

Exam tip: When you see language like “the harm was a foreseeable result of the defendant’s negligence” or “the harm fell outside the scope of the risk created by the negligence,” the question is about proximate cause, not actual cause.

Actual Cause vs. Proximate Cause

You must always separate:

• Actual cause (cause in fact) – Would the harm have occurred but for the defendant’s breach? If multiple forces are at work, did the defendant’s conduct remain a substantial factor in producing the harm?
• Proximate cause (legal cause) – Is the harm within the reasonable scope of risks created by that breach?

A defendant can be an actual cause but not a proximate cause. The reverse is not possible: there is no proximate cause without some actual causal contribution.

Exam tip: If an answer choice focuses only on the “but for” test or “substantial factor” and says nothing about foreseeability or scope of risk, it is probably addressing actual cause, not proximate cause.

Multiple Actual Causes and Proximate Cause

Actual cause becomes more complex when there are:

• Concurrent causes – Two negligent acts combine to cause a single harm (e.g., two drivers negligently block exits from a building and a fire breaks out).
• Alternative causes – Two negligent actors, but only one actually caused the harm and it is impossible to determine which (e.g., two hunters firing in plaintiff’s direction).

Even in these cases, proximate cause analysis still asks: is the kind of harm that occurred within the scope of risk created by each defendant’s negligent conduct?

• If yes, each negligent defendant whose act was a substantial factor is usually a proximate cause.
• The fact that someone else’s negligence also contributed does not cut off the first defendant’s liability.

Direct and Indirect Cause Cases

MBE questions often frame proximate cause problems as direct cause or indirect cause cases.

Direct Cause

A direct cause case is one where the defendant's negligence leads straight to the plaintiff's injury, with no significant intervening event.

In these cases the analysis is usually straightforward:

• If the type of harm is one of the risks that made the conduct negligent, proximate cause is usually found.
• The defendant need not foresee the exact sequence of events, the extent of the harm, or the precise manner by which it occurs.

For example, negligent speeding that results in a collision is a classic direct cause situation. Collisions and resulting physical injuries are exactly the kind of harms that make speeding negligent.

In a direct cause case, proximate cause is typically present unless the result is so bizarre that no reasonable person would have anticipated that kind of harm from that kind of negligence.

Example pattern: A driver negligently runs a red light, forcing another driver to swerve and hit a tree. Whether the tree branch breaks the plaintiff’s arm or causes a rare infection requiring amputation, both harms are direct and within the broad category of “physical injury in a crash.”

Indirect Cause and Intervening Events

An indirect cause case involves an intervening event between the defendant's negligence and the plaintiff's injury.

Key Term: Intervening Cause
An event occurring after the defendant's negligent act that contributes to the plaintiff's injury.

Intervening causes are extremely common and do not automatically relieve the original defendant of liability. The key question is whether the intervening cause is itself a foreseeable response to the situation created by the defendant.

• If the intervening cause is foreseeable, it is simply part of the causal chain; the original defendant remains liable.
• If the intervening cause is extraordinary or unforeseeable, it may be classified as a superseding cause, which breaks the chain.

Key Term: Superseding Cause
An unforeseeable intervening event that breaks the chain of causation and absolves the original defendant of liability for subsequent harm.

Traditional torts language sometimes distinguishes dependent from independent intervening forces:

• Dependent forces are normal responses to the danger created by the defendant (rescue efforts, medical treatment, escape attempts).
• Independent forces are coincidences that operate on the situation (storms, criminal acts, random third-party negligence).

Dependent forces are usually foreseeable and thus not superseding. Independent forces may be superseding if they are outside the scope of the original risk.

Exam tip: Do not assume that the presence of another negligent or intentional actor ends the first defendant’s liability. Many intervening acts are foreseeable and therefore do not supersede.

Foreseeable and Unforeseeable Results

Foreseeable Results

If the general type of harm is foreseeable, the defendant is liable even if:

• The harm occurs in an unusual manner;
• The extent of harm is far greater than expected; or
• The harm is aggravated by the plaintiff’s pre-existing condition (eggshell plaintiff).

The test is not whether the defendant foresaw the exact details, but whether the injury that occurred is one of the risks that made the conduct negligent.

Consider a store that negligently leaves water on the floor. The risks that make this negligent include customers slipping and:

• Suffering broken bones,
• Suffering head injuries,
• Suffering back injuries.

If a customer slips and has an unusually severe spinal injury because of a congenital condition, that is still within the type of harm that makes wet floors unreasonable, even though the severity is unexpected.

Unforeseeable Results

If the harm is of a type not reasonably anticipated from the defendant's conduct, liability is usually denied. This is often framed in terms of the harm being outside the scope of the risk.

For example, if a driver negligently bumps a car, and hours later, far away, the other driver is struck by lightning while getting a repair estimate, that lightning strike is not within the scope of risk created by the minor collision.

Similarly, purely economic losses to remote parties, with no physical impact or property damage, are ordinarily deemed too remote and unforeseeable in negligence.

Worked Example 1.1

A driver negligently leaves a car blocking a fire hydrant. A fire breaks out nearby, and firefighters are delayed in accessing water, resulting in greater property damage. Is the driver liable for the increased damage?

Answer:
Yes. The increased property damage is a foreseeable result of blocking a hydrant, because one of the obvious risks of obstructing a hydrant is delayed firefighting and more extensive fire damage. The driver’s conduct is both an actual cause (the delay would not have occurred but for the blockage) and a proximate cause (the type of harm is within the scope of risk), so proximate cause is satisfied.

Worked Example 1.2

A shopkeeper negligently leaves a trapdoor open. A customer falls in and is injured. While being transported to the hospital, the ambulance is struck by a drunk driver, causing further injury to the customer. Is the shopkeeper liable for the additional injury?

Answer:
Yes, in most jurisdictions. Negligent medical transport and negligent driving are foreseeable risks once a person is injured and must be moved. Ordinary negligence by rescuers or others in the chain of response is a classic foreseeable intervening cause. The drunk driver’s negligence does not usually break the chain; both the shopkeeper and the drunk driver are actual and proximate causes of the additional harm. Only if the ambulance driver’s conduct were extraordinarily bizarre or intentional might it be treated as a superseding cause.

Time, Distance, and Remoteness

Foreseeability also has a time and distance dimension:

• The longer the time gap and the more events between the breach and the harm, the more likely a court is to find the result too remote.
• However, no fixed cutoff applies. The question remains whether the harm is still within the general risk that made the conduct negligent.

An exam pattern is to show a long chain of events but tie each step tightly to the preceding one, all within the sort of risk that negligence created. In those cases, even a long chain can still fall within proximate cause.

Intervening vs. Superseding Causes

Proximate cause analysis in indirect cause cases turns on how you classify the intervening event.

Foreseeable Intervening Causes (No Break in Liability)

The following are normally foreseeable responses to the risk created by the defendant’s negligence and therefore do not cut off liability:

• Medical malpractice in treating the original injury.
  • The original tortfeasor remains liable for additional harm caused by negligent treatment.
• Negligence by rescuers.
  • “Danger invites rescue.” The defendant is liable for injuries to the plaintiff and to rescuers, unless the rescuer’s conduct is highly extraordinary.
• Efforts by others to protect life or property.
  • The defendant is liable for harm resulting from reasonable efforts to escape danger or protect property.
• Subsequent disease or accident due to the weakened condition caused by the original injury.
  • For example, a plaintiff whose leg is weakened by negligence and later falls again because of that weakness.

In each of these, the later event is exactly the kind of thing that commonly happens once the original harm occurs, so it is within the scope of foreseeable consequences.

Exam tip: Many MBE questions mention later medical treatment, rescue attempts, or accidents made more likely by the plaintiff’s injuries. Unless the later conduct is wildly unusual or intentional, treat it as foreseeable—not a superseding cause.

Superseding Causes (Break in Liability)

An intervening cause is superseding only if it is not reasonably foreseeable and is so abnormal that it breaks the chain of causation. Common examples include:

• Unforeseeable criminal acts or intentional torts by third parties, when the original negligence did not create or increase the risk of that very misconduct.
• Extraordinary natural events (“acts of God”), such as unprecedented storms or earthquakes, when not one of the risks that made the defendant’s conduct negligent.
• Grossly negligent or intentional acts that are not a normal response to the situation created by the defendant.

In these situations, the law treats the later event as the predominant legal cause of the harm; the original defendant’s liability stops where the superseding cause begins.

Worked Example 1.3

A contractor negligently leaves a ladder outside a building. A thief uses the ladder to break into the building and steal valuables. Is the contractor liable for the theft?

Answer:
Usually no. The thief’s intentional criminal act is typically treated as an unforeseeable superseding cause, breaking the chain of proximate cause. Ordinary negligence in leaving equipment nearby does not ordinarily create a duty to prevent sophisticated criminal acts. Because the type of harm (intentional burglary) is not a normal, foreseeable result of leaving a ladder unattended in this context, the contractor is not liable for the stolen property.

Note, however, that if the contractor’s negligence was in a context where criminal misuse was highly predictable (for example, leaving a ladder propped against a known high-crime apartment building to an unlocked balcony), an exam question might test the argument that the particular crime was foreseeable and therefore not superseding. Always read the facts for clues about foreseeability.

Additional Intervening-Cause Patterns

To deepen your analysis on the MBE, keep these patterns in mind:

• Third-party crimes where the original negligence increases the risk of crime:
  • If a landlord negligently fails to provide promised locks or lighting in a building with known security issues, and a tenant is assaulted, the criminal act is more likely to be viewed as foreseeable, not superseding.
• Subsequent accidents due to a weakened condition:
  • If a plaintiff’s original injury leaves them unsteady, making a later fall more likely, the original tortfeasor is usually liable for the compounded harm.
• Subsequent negligent treatment:
  • Even serious negligence by doctors or hospitals in treating the original injury is generally foreseeable; the original defendant remains liable for the worsened condition.

Worked Example 1.4

A bus company negligently fails to maintain its brakes, causing a crash that fractures a passenger’s hip. At the hospital, a doctor negligently administers the wrong medication, causing kidney damage. Is the bus company liable for the kidney damage?

Answer:
Yes. Medical negligence in treating injuries caused by the defendant’s negligence is a classic foreseeable intervening cause. The risk that a patient may receive imperfect treatment is within the scope of risk associated with causing bodily injury. The bus company remains liable for the full extent of the worsened condition, including the kidney damage caused by the doctor’s negligence, in addition to its own causal share.

Worked Example 1.5

A hotel negligently fails to fix a broken lock on a guest’s door despite knowing of prior break-ins on the floor. A criminal enters through the broken door and assaults a guest. Is the hotel’s negligence a proximate cause of the assault?

Answer:
Likely yes. Here, the hotel’s negligence directly increased the risk of criminal intrusion in circumstances where such crimes were foreseeable (prior break-ins). The criminal assault is therefore within the scope of the risk the hotel created. The criminal’s act is an intervening cause, but not a superseding one; both the hotel and the assailant are proximate causes of the guest’s injuries.

Worked Example 1.6

A city negligently leaves a large unlit excavation hole in a sidewalk. A passerby falls in and is injured. During surgery to fix the injury, an unexpected, extremely rare allergic reaction to standard anesthesia causes significant brain damage. The reaction occurs even though the doctors act non-negligently. Is the city liable for the brain damage?

Answer:
Yes, in most jurisdictions. The general type of harm at issue is bodily injury requiring medical treatment. Complications of treatment—even rare ones occurring without negligence—are within the broad category of risks that flow from creating the need for treatment. The unusual allergic reaction does not break the chain of causation; the city remains liable for all physical harm that naturally flows from the initial injury.

The "Eggshell Plaintiff" Rule

A defendant takes the plaintiff as found. If the plaintiff has a pre-existing vulnerability or condition, the defendant is liable for the full extent of the injury, even if it is more severe than what would be expected for an average person.

Key Term: Eggshell Plaintiff Rule
The principle that a defendant is liable for the full extent of a plaintiff's injury, even if the injury is unexpectedly severe due to a pre-existing condition.

This rule operates at the damages stage, not the proximate cause stage:

• Proximate cause asks whether the type of harm is foreseeable.
• The eggshell-plaintiff rule says that, once that type of harm is foreseeable, the extent or severity of the harm need not be foreseeable.

So long as some bodily injury of the kind that occurred was within the scope of risk, the defendant must pay for all resulting physical consequences, even if the plaintiff’s unusual susceptibility (e.g., brittle-bone disease, hemophilia, psychiatric vulnerability) makes the outcome dramatic.

Worked Example 1.7

A driver negligently bumps into a pedestrian at low speed. Most people would have suffered only bruises, but the pedestrian has a rare bone disease, and both legs fracture badly. Is the driver liable for the full extent of the injuries?

Answer:
Yes. Some bodily injury from negligent driving is clearly foreseeable. Once that threshold is met, the eggshell plaintiff rule requires the driver to pay for all resulting harm, even though the extent of the injury is far greater than anticipated. The plaintiff’s unusual fragility does not limit the defendant’s liability.

The eggshell rule applies broadly:

• It covers physical vulnerabilities (weak bones, pre-existing back problems).
• It can also apply to emotional or psychological vulnerabilities, where the defendant’s conduct foreseeably risks emotional harm (for example, negligent mishandling of a corpse leading to severe distress in a particularly sensitive relative).

However, the eggshell rule does not expand the categories of compensable harm. If the type of harm is not within the scope of the risk, eggshell-plaintiff does not rescue the claim.

Example: If a defendant’s negligence creates only a risk of property damage (say, negligently damaging a utility line), and a plaintiff suffers purely economic loss far away due to a factory shutdown, the eggshell rule does not apply because the type of harm (remote economic loss) was not one of the risks that made the conduct negligent.

Extent of Damages

Proximate cause limits the type of harm for which a defendant is liable, but not the extent of that harm.

Once the type of injury is foreseeable and within the scope of risk:

• The defendant is responsible for all resulting damages, however serious, including aggravations, complications, and unusual consequences flowing from the initial injury.
• This includes physical, economic, and (where allowed) emotional harms that flow from that injury, subject to the usual proof and mitigation rules.
• Subsequent injuries that are a natural result of the condition created by the original injury (e.g., falls due to a weakened leg, infections from open wounds) are also within proximate cause.

This is why the eggshell plaintiff rule coexists with the foreseeability test: foreseeability is about what kind of harm occurs, not about predicting every detail of how bad it will be.

Interaction with Duty to Mitigate

Plaintiffs have a duty to take reasonable steps to mitigate damages:

• If they unreasonably refuse recommended medical treatment that would clearly reduce their harm, some jurisdictions limit recovery for the avoidable portion of the damage.
• But many ordinary decisions—such as choosing among reasonable treatment options—do not break the chain of causation.

On an MBE question, mitigation issues are rarely the central focus. When proximate cause is the issue, you should usually assume that the plaintiff’s follow-up choices were reasonable unless the facts clearly label them as extreme.

Multiple Tortfeasors, Joint and Several Liability, and Proximate Cause

On the MBE, negligence problems frequently involve more than one negligent actor.

Key Term: Joint and Several Liability
A rule under which each of multiple tortfeasors whose negligence is a proximate cause of an indivisible injury is liable to the plaintiff for the entire damage amount, subject to contribution among them.

The NCBE tells you to assume joint and several liability unless the question specifies otherwise. This has several implications for proximate cause analysis:

• If two negligent defendants are both proximate causes of an indivisible injury, the plaintiff may recover the full amount from either one.
• The fact that a second tortfeasor could also be sued does not relieve the first of liability.
• Questions asking whether one defendant is liable should be answered based on that defendant’s own breach and the scope of risk—not on the presence of other negligent actors.

Indivisible vs. Divisible Harm

Courts distinguish:

• Indivisible harm – Cannot be logically separated (e.g., a single lost limb, a single car fully destroyed). Multiple tortfeasors whose negligence is a proximate cause are jointly and severally liable.
• Divisible harm – Can be separated (e.g., injury to different body parts at different times, separate fires burning separate parts of property). Each tortfeasor is liable only for the harm they caused.

On an exam, if the fact pattern does not clearly provide a basis for dividing the harm, assume it is indivisible and apply joint and several liability.

Successive vs. Concurrent Negligence

• Concurrent negligence – Two negligent acts occurring close in time combine to cause one injury (two cars colliding and crushing the plaintiff).
• Successive negligence – One actor causes an initial injury, and later negligence by another actor aggravates it.

Proximate cause analysis:

• The first actor is usually liable for both the initial and aggravated harm if the aggravation is a foreseeable consequence (e.g., negligent medical treatment, falls due to weakened condition).
• The second actor is liable for the harm that can be traced to their negligence (including the incremental harm).

Worked Example 1.8

A driver negligently injures a pedestrian’s leg. Six months later, while the leg is still weak, the pedestrian negligently stumbles on his own stairs at home and re-injures the leg, making the overall condition much worse. The pedestrian sues the driver. Is the driver liable for the harm from the second fall?

Answer:
Yes, to a substantial extent. The weakened leg is a direct result of the driver’s negligence, and a later fall due to that weakness is a foreseeable consequence. The driver is a proximate cause of the worsened leg condition even though the plaintiff’s own negligence contributed; comparative negligence principles would reduce, but not eliminate, recovery. The second fall is an intervening, but not superseding, cause.

Exam tip: Do not assume that later negligent conduct by the plaintiff or another defendant cuts off liability. The key question is whether that later conduct and its consequences fall within the risks created by the original negligence.

Common MBE Traps in Proximate Cause

Two recurring patterns cause trouble on the exam.

Confusing Actual Cause with Proximate Cause

Exam warning:
The most common MBE trap is confusing actual cause with proximate cause. A choice that says “because the injury would not have occurred but for the defendant’s conduct, the defendant is liable” is only addressing cause in fact.

You should:

• First, determine whether the defendant’s conduct is an actual cause using but-for or substantial-factor reasoning.
• Then, separately ask whether the harm is within the foreseeable scope of risk and whether any intervening events are superseding.

If the harm is too remote or outside the scope of the risk, proximate cause fails even if cause in fact is present.

Mislabeling Intervening Causes as Superseding

A second frequent trap is mislabeling intervening causes:

• The mere presence of another negligent actor does not automatically cut off the first defendant’s liability.
• Only unforeseeable intervening causes are superseding. Foreseeable intervening causes leave the original defendant fully liable (often jointly and severally liable along with the later tortfeasor).

Look for signals in the facts:

• Words like “highly unusual,” “freakish,” “extraordinary,” or “unprecedented” suggest a superseding cause.
• References to ordinary negligence, rescue efforts, or common complications of medical care usually indicate foreseeable intervening causes.

Worked Example 1.9

A shipping company negligently fails to secure cargo on a truck. While the truck is stopped at a red light, a third-party driver intentionally rams the truck out of road rage, causing the cargo to spill and injure a pedestrian. The pedestrian sues the shipping company. Is the shipping company liable?

Answer:
Likely no. Intentional road-rage collisions are not the kind of risk that makes failure to secure cargo negligent. The core risk of unsecured cargo is that sudden stops or turns will cause it to shift and injure others, not that someone will intentionally crash into the truck. The third party’s intentional criminal act is an unforeseeable superseding cause that breaks the chain of proximate cause for the shipping company, though the intentional driver remains liable.

Summary Judgment and Proximate Cause

Occasionally an MBE question asks whether a case involving proximate cause should be decided on summary judgment:

• Proximate cause is often a fact question for the jury because it turns on foreseeability.
• Summary judgment is appropriate only when no reasonable jury could find the harm foreseeable (or unforeseeable) based on the facts.

If the fact pattern is debatable—there are arguments on both sides—an answer that says proximate cause is for the jury, not appropriate for summary judgment, is likely correct.

Revision Tip

When analyzing a negligence question, work through causation in order:

• Was the defendant’s breach an actual cause of the harm (but-for or substantial factor)?
• Was the type of harm suffered by the plaintiff a reasonably foreseeable result of the defendant's conduct (within the scope of risk)?
• Did any intervening cause break the chain of causation by being unforeseeable and superseding?
  If step (2) or (3) fails, proximate cause is likely missing.

Key Point Checklist

This article has covered the following key knowledge points:

• Proximate cause is a separate requirement from actual cause and limits negligence liability to harms within the foreseeable scope of risk created by the defendant's conduct.
• Foreseeability is the main test for proximate cause; the type of harm, not the exact manner or extent, must be foreseeable.
• The “scope of the risk” asks what risks made the conduct negligent and limits liability to those risks.
• Direct cause cases usually involve no intervening events; if the type of harm is one of the risks that made the conduct negligent, proximate cause is satisfied.
• Intervening causes that are foreseeable responses to the situation (e.g., medical malpractice, negligent rescue, subsequent accidents from weakened condition) do not break the chain of causation.
• Superseding causes are intervening events that are unforeseeable and extraordinary, such as unusual criminal acts or extreme natural events not within the original scope of risk, and they relieve the defendant of liability for subsequent harm.
• The "eggshell plaintiff" rule makes the defendant liable for the full extent of injury, even if unusually severe due to the plaintiff’s pre-existing condition, once the general type of harm is foreseeable.
• Proximate cause limits the category of compensable harm, but once satisfied, the defendant must pay for all resulting damages, however extensive.
• When multiple tortfeasors negligently cause an indivisible injury, joint and several liability allows the plaintiff to recover the full amount from any one defendant whose negligence is a proximate cause.
• On the MBE, careful attention to the sequence of events and whether later events are foreseeable is important for separating intervening from superseding causes and for avoiding confusion between actual and proximate cause.

Key Terms and Concepts

• Proximate Cause
• Foreseeability
• Scope of the Risk
• Intervening Cause
• Superseding Cause
• Eggshell Plaintiff Rule
• Joint and Several Liability