## Facts

- Herman Neiman was a civilian who was not a servicemember in the Israeli military and was not under a duty to enlist.
- Neiman worked for approximately two months for the Defence Army of Israel’s Corps of Engineers under a special contract; his only connection to the army was this employment arrangement.
- Neiman did not formally enlist or take an enlistment oath, and he remained a civilian contractor during his work for the Corps of Engineers.
- During the contract period, Neiman allegedly assaulted a member of the army (and engaged in related misconduct that could constitute criminal offenses).
- After Neiman stopped working for the army and returned to civilian life, military authorities filed charges against him in a military court in Jerusalem (the indictment was dated 18 August 1948).
- On 5 September 1948, Neiman was ordered to appear before the District Court of the Defence Army of Israel in Jerusalem as an accused.
- Neiman petitioned the Supreme Court of Israel sitting as the High Court of Justice, seeking to bar the military prosecution on the ground that the military court lacked personal jurisdiction under the Army Code, 1948.

## Issues

1. Whether Neiman qualified as a “soldier” under the Army Code, 1948 during the period of his special-contract work for the army.
2. If Neiman was a “soldier” when the alleged assault occurred, whether the Army Code permitted a military court to try him after he had ceased to be a soldier by the time of indictment and trial.

## Decision

- The Court held that Neiman was a “soldier” within the meaning of the Army Code, 1948 during the period of his contracted work, as to acts allegedly committed during that time.
- The Court held that when the indictment was filed and the military court was asked to act, Neiman had ceased to be a soldier.
- The Court held that the military court therefore lacked jurisdiction to try him, because the Army Code did not authorize trial of a person who was not a soldier when the proceedings were initiated.
- The Court granted relief preventing the military authorities and the military district court from proceeding with the case against Neiman in the military forum.

## Legal Principles

- Military-court personal jurisdiction under the Army Code, 1948 requires that the accused be a “soldier” at the time military proceedings are commenced and conducted, not merely at the time of the alleged offense.
- Grants of military criminal jurisdiction are exceptional and are construed narrowly; absent clear statutory language, courts will not infer continuing jurisdiction over former soldiers or former persons treated as soldiers.
- A civilian may be treated as a “soldier” for limited purposes under the Army Code while working directly for the army under a special contract, even without formal enlistment.
- Where the Army Code does not confer military jurisdiction, alleged criminal conduct remains subject to prosecution in the ordinary civilian courts.

## Conclusion

Neiman held that although a civilian contractor could be treated as a “soldier” under the Army Code, 1948 during his contracted service with the army, the military courts could not try him once that status ended; personal jurisdiction depended on his being a soldier at the time of indictment and trial, and the petition to stop the military proceedings was granted.


Neiman v. Military Governor of the Occupied Area of Jerusalem, HCJ 1/48 (1948)