## Facts

- New York Life Insurance Company issued a life insurance policy on Howard B. McNeely (Howard) that provided double-indemnity benefits only if death was caused by “external, violent and accidental means.”
- Lillian McNeely (Lillian), Howard’s widow and the policy beneficiary, sued to recover the double-indemnity amount after Howard’s death.
- Evidence at trial showed Howard’s car was found run off the road, with the left front wheel and front axle bent and a damaged fender.
- Between 24 and 48 hours later, Howard’s body was found about 200 feet from the car.
- The body was decomposing; there was discoloration on a hand and on the back of the head, blood and froth at the nose and mouth, and flies and maggots were present.
- There were no marks of bodily injury and no signs of violent death.
- Lillian relied mainly on circumstantial evidence to connect the vehicle incident to death by accidental means; the theory required drawing successive inferences from the physical scene.
- New York Life offered two letters and a will, all in Howard’s handwriting and found in his pockets, as evidence bearing on the manner of death. The trial court excluded these writings.
- The jury returned a verdict for Lillian awarding double-indemnity benefits, and New York Life appealed.

## Issues

1. In a claim for double-indemnity benefits limited to death by “external, violent and accidental means,” does the beneficiary bear the burden to prove accidental death within the policy’s coverage clause?
2. Did the trial court commit reversible error by excluding the two handwritten letters and the will found on Howard’s person as evidence bearing on whether death was accidental or non-accidental?
3. Was the jury’s finding of accidental death improperly based on stacked inferences from circumstantial evidence?

## Decision

- The Arizona Supreme Court reversed the judgment for Lillian and remanded for a new trial.
- The court held the trial court erred in excluding the letters and will found in Howard’s pockets; the writings were relevant to the disputed question of how Howard died.
- The court stated that, for double-indemnity recovery, the beneficiary must first bring the death within the accidental-means coverage clause.
- The court also noted that the accidental-death theory rested on successive inferences from circumstantial proof, and the excluded writings could materially affect how the jury evaluated competing explanations.

## Legal Principles

- When a policy provides extra benefits only upon proof of death by “external, violent and accidental means,” the beneficiary must prove that the death falls within that accidental-means coverage before recovering the additional amount.
- Circumstantial evidence may prove accidental death, but a verdict cannot rest on a chain of speculative inferences where the conclusion depends on multiple unsupported steps.
- Writings found on the insured’s person near the time of death (such as letters or a will) may be admissible as part of the surrounding circumstances when they tend to show the insured’s intent or state of mind and bear on whether death was accidental or self-inflicted.
- Excluding relevant, material evidence that bears directly on the cause or manner of death in a double-indemnity case can require reversal and a new trial.

## Conclusion

New York Life Insurance Co. v. McNeely reversed a jury award of double-indemnity benefits because the case turned on contested inferences about whether Howard McNeely’s death was accidental, and the trial court wrongly kept from the jury letters and a will found on his body that could inform that determination; the matter was remanded for a new trial with the beneficiary required to prove death by accidental means within the policy’s coverage clause.


New York Life Insurance Co. v. McNeely, 79 P.2d 948 (1938)