## Facts

- New York law generally prohibited possession of a handgun without a license, and in New York City the NYPD License Division administered handgun licensing.
- New York City issued “premises licenses” allowing residents to keep a handgun in the home for self-protection at the address listed on the license.
- A city rule (38 RCNY § 5-23) generally prohibited premises licensees from removing the handgun from the licensed residence, with limited exceptions.
- One exception allowed a premises licensee to transport an unloaded handgun, in a locked container, with ammunition carried separately, directly to and from an “authorized” shooting range; the City treated “authorized” ranges as those located within New York City.
- All seven authorized ranges were located in New York City, with at least one range in each borough.
- The New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc., and individual premises-license holders (Romolo Colantone, Efrain Alvarez, and Jose Anthony Irizarry) sued the City of New York and the NYPD License Division.
- Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to allow transport of their premises-licensed handguns to shooting ranges and competitions outside New York City; Colantone also sought to transport his handgun between his city residence and a second home outside the city.
- The City moved for summary judgment in the Southern District of New York.
- The district court granted summary judgment for the City, holding the transport restriction did not violate the Second Amendment and also rejecting claims under the Dormant Commerce Clause and the constitutional right to travel.
- Plaintiffs appealed; the Second Circuit reviewed the summary judgment decision de novo.

## Issues

1. Does New York City’s premises-license transport restriction (limiting transport to in-city authorized ranges and otherwise requiring the handgun to remain at the licensed premises) violate the Second Amendment?
2. Does the restriction violate the Dormant Commerce Clause by discriminating against or unduly burdening interstate commerce in shooting-range services?
3. Does the restriction violate the constitutional right to travel by penalizing or deterring travel outside New York City?

## Decision

- The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the City.
- On the Second Amendment claim, the court applied its two-step framework, assumed without deciding that the regulated conduct fell within the Second Amendment’s scope, and held intermediate scrutiny applied because the rule did not meaningfully burden the core right to possess a handgun in the home for self-defense.
- The court held the transport restriction was substantially related to important governmental interests in public safety and crime prevention, including reducing opportunities for theft, loss, and misuse during transport and aiding enforceability.
- The court noted the burden was limited in part because premises licensees could practice at ranges within New York City and, as to a second home, could obtain a separately licensed handgun for that location.
- On the Dormant Commerce Clause claim, the court held the rule was not facially discriminatory and did not, in practical effect, discriminate against interstate commerce; any incidental burden was not clearly excessive in relation to the City’s local public-safety benefits.
- On the right-to-travel claim, the court held the rule regulated firearm transport and possession rather than movement of persons, and did not penalize or directly deter interstate travel or treat travelers differently based on residency or travel.

## Legal Principles

- In the Second Circuit’s then-governing approach to Second Amendment challenges, courts used a two-step analysis: (1) whether the conduct is within the Second Amendment as historically understood; and (2) if so, the appropriate level of scrutiny and whether the law satisfies it.
- Where a regulation does not substantially burden the core Second Amendment right identified in *District of Columbia v. Heller*—possession of a handgun in the home for self-defense—intermediate scrutiny may apply.
- Under intermediate scrutiny, the government need not use the least restrictive means; it must show a substantial relationship (a reasonable fit) between the law and important governmental interests such as public safety and crime prevention.
- A law violates the Dormant Commerce Clause if it discriminates against interstate commerce on its face or in practical effect; if it is nondiscriminatory, it is generally assessed under *Pike* balancing for whether incidental burdens are clearly excessive compared to local benefits.
- The constitutional right to travel is implicated when the government penalizes or directly deters interstate movement or discriminates based on residency; a restriction on transporting a regulated item does not necessarily amount to a travel penalty.

## Conclusion

The Second Circuit upheld New York City’s premises-license rule restricting handgun transport to authorized in-city ranges, ruling that the law imposed only a modest burden beyond the home and survived intermediate scrutiny under the Second Amendment, and further holding that the rule neither discriminated against nor unduly burdened interstate commerce and did not penalize the constitutional right to travel.


New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. City of New York, 883 F.3d 45 (2018)