## Facts

- Joseph L. Newman and a co-defendant, Anderson, were jointly indicted in federal court for housebreaking and petty larceny.
- In plea negotiations, the prosecutor agreed to let Anderson plead guilty to lesser misdemeanor charges (petty larceny and attempted housebreaking).
- The prosecutor refused to accept an identical plea to lesser charges from Newman.
- Newman was prosecuted on the indicted charges and challenged the prosecutor’s refusal as constitutionally unfair compared to Anderson’s treatment.

## Issues

1. Whether due process, equal protection, or a claimed right to “equal standing” is violated when the prosecutor accepts a co-defendant’s plea to lesser included offenses but refuses the same plea from another defendant.
2. Whether and when federal courts may review or control prosecutorial discretion in plea bargaining and charging decisions that differentiate among co-defendants.

## Decision

- The court affirmed the judgment against Newman.
- The prosecutor’s decision to accept a lesser plea from one defendant and refuse the same plea from another was treated as an executive function committed to prosecutorial discretion.
- On this record, the disparity in plea treatment did not establish a denial of due process or equal protection.
- The court found no showing that the prosecutor acted on impermissible or invidious grounds; absent such proof, judicial intervention was not warranted.

## Legal Principles

- Charging decisions, decisions whether to pursue or dismiss prosecutions, and decisions whether to accept negotiated pleas are primarily exercises of executive prosecutorial discretion.
- Courts generally will not supervise or second-guess differential plea-bargaining decisions among co-defendants as a constitutional matter.
- A defendant challenging unequal plea treatment must show that the prosecutor’s decision rested on prohibited criteria (e.g., invidious discrimination) or another clear constitutional violation; disparity alone is insufficient.
- Separation-of-powers limits judicial control over the prosecutor’s choices in selecting charges and consenting (or not consenting) to particular guilty pleas.

## Conclusion

The court held that a prosecutor may accept a co-defendant’s plea to lesser charges while refusing an identical plea from another defendant, and that such differential plea bargaining is ordinarily not subject to judicial control absent proof of unconstitutional discrimination or a clear constitutional violation.


Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1967)